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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1995 Florida Legislature dramatically transformed Florida's
partnership law by enacting the Florida Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (FRUPA or the Revised Florida Act) and by authorizing regis-
tered limited liability partnerships (known as RLLPs or LLPs) in Flor-
ida.'
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) approved a final revision of the Uniform Part-
nership Act (RUPA or the Revised Uniform Act).2 Although
1. Both acts were enacted as a part of 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242. See infra note 4.
2. The original Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) was promulgated by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1914 and eventually adopted in
every state except Louisiana. See Prefatory Note to UNi. P~Airre~ssm1' ACT (1994), 6 U.L.A. 1
(1995). Florida adopted the UPA in 1972. See 1972, Fla. Laws ch. 72-108 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 620.56-.77 (1995)).
An American Bar Association (ABA) report in 1986 called for change. See UPA Rev. Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Orgs., Should the Uniform Partnership
Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121 (1987). In 1987, NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee to
revise the UPA and named Donald J. Weidner, Dean of the Florida State University College of
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dramatically different in many ways from the original Uniform Part-
nership Act (UPA), RUPA is an evolution of traditional partnership
law rather than a radical departure from the past. Florida was the
fifth state3 to adopt RUPA,4 to which it made relatively few changes.
Although enacted as a part of the same bill, the limited liability
partnership provisions were not part of RUPA.5 Despite their
Law, as the Reporter. Professor Larson was named Assistant Reporter in 1991.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act was initially approved by NCCUSL in 1992. The
following year, in response to suggestions from various groups, including the ABA and several
state bar associations, numerous revisions to the Act were adopted. The Revised Act was restyled
as the Uniform Partnership Act (1993). Further changes were made the following year, and the
Uniform Partnership Act (1994), as finally adopted by NCCUSL, was approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in August 1994. See Prefatory Note to UNIt. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994), 6
U.L.A. 1, 2-5 (1995). Accordingly, all references herein to RUPA are to the final 1994 revision
unless otherwise indicated.
3. In 1993, Montana and Wyoming adopted the 1992 version of RUPA. See Montana
Uniform Partnership Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to -616 (1993); Wyoming Uniform
Partnership Act, WYo. STAT. §§ 17-21-101 to -1003 (Supp. 1993).
North Dakota and West Virginia adopted the 1994 Revised Act shortly before Florida. See
1995 N.D. Laws ch. 430; 1995 W. Va. Acts ch. 250. Connecticut enacted the Act soon thereaf-
ter. See 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 92-341 (Reg. Sess.).
Texas has also adopted a new partnership act heavily influenced by the Revised Uniform Act,
although reflecting early drafts of RUPA on several key matters. See Texas Revised Partnership
Act, TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (West 1995).
4. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 13, 2150, 2160. The Revised Florida Act was introduced
by companion bills in the 1995 Florida Legislature as Florida Senate Bill 1690 and Florida House
Bill 2187. Most of the changes from the Revised Uniform Act were drafted by a Florida Bar
Drafting Committee, a joint effort between the Business and Tax Law Sections. The committee
was co-chaired by Philip B. Schwartz, of Miami, and Louis T.M. Conti, of Orlando. Anderson
L. (Trey) Baldy III, of Tampa, was the committee reporter. Professor Larson was a member of
The Florida Bar Drafting Committee.
Senate Bill 1690 was approved, with one amendment, by the Commerce Committee on April
24, 1995, was referred to the Judiciary Committee and, subsequently, to the Ways and Means
Committee, where it died. FLA. S. JotR. 532 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
House Bill 2187 was referred to the Finance Committee, see FLA. H.R. Joua. 244 (Reg. Sess.
1995), where a committee substitute bill was introduced and read for the first time on May 1,
1995. Id. at 1030, 1034. The bill was then referred to the Appropriations Committee but later
died on the calendar. FLA. LEass., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE B.LS at 242, HB 2187.
On May 2, in the waning days of the session, on recommendation of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee, Senator Harris moved that FRUPA be added by amendment to Senate Bill 2296, the Cultural
Affairs funding bill. FLA. S. Joun. 657 (Reg. Sess. 1995). That amendment was further amended by
Senator Harris and adopted, as amended. Id. at 669. Senate Bill 2296, as amended, was passed
unanimously by the Senate on May 2, id. at 673, and by the House of Representatives on May 4,
1995, FLA. H.R. Jout. 1283 (Reg. Sess. 1995). The enrolled bill was sent to the Governor on May 24
and became law without the Governor's signature on June 9, 1995. FLA. LEts., HIsToRY OF LEois-
LATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BiLis at 165, SB 2296.
5. 'The LLP provisions were actually enacted twice by the 1995 Florida Legislature. See 1995,
Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, §§ 1-12, 2150, 2152; 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-409, §§ 1-12, 3372, 3373.
The LLP legislation was introduced by companion bills as Florida House Bill 717 and Senate Bill
894. House Bill 717 was referred to the Commerce and Finance and Taxation Committees. FLA.
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fundamentally different character, limited liability partnerships have
swept the nation in the past four years.' An LLP is simply a general
partnership except that, by virtue of the statutory LLP provisions, the
partners have no personal liability, as partners, for certain debts and
obligations of the partnership. The LLP provisions usually amend the
state's basic partnership act, 7 but in a few states, including Florida,
they are separate from, but operate in conjunction with, the state's
partnership act.'
After eighty years of nearly uniform and virtually unchanged part-
nership law, the recent passage of these two laws has ushered in a
H.R. Joui. 56 (Reg. Sess. 1995). The Commerce Committee referred the bill to the Banking and
Corporations Subcommittee, which recommended the bill favorably, with one amendment. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1995 REGULAR SaSSION, HISTORY OF HousE BusS at 256, HB 717.
On March 16, the Commerce Committee approved a Committee Substitute for HB 717. FLA. H.R.
JouR. 304 (Reg. Sess. 1995). That bill was then referred to the Finance and Taxation Committee,
which recommended the bill favorably on April 18. Id. at 565. On April 27, CS for HB 717 was
placed on the Consent Calendar and, with amendments, was passed by the House of Representatives
by a vote of 115 to 1. Id. at 879. On May 2, the Senate substituted CS for HB 717 for CS for SB 894
and passed the bill, 38 to 0. FiA. S. JouR. 673 (Reg. Sess. 1995). The enrolled bill was sent to the
Governor on June 6 and became law without his signature on June 18, 1995. FLA. LEoss., HISTORY
OF LGISLA.ION, 1995 REOULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE B.us at 256, HB 717; see 1995, Fla.
Laws ch. 95-409. The effective date of that bill was October 1, 1995. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-409,
3372, 3382.
On May 2, the same day the Senate passed CS for HB 717, Senator McKay moved to amend SB
2296 further by adding the LLP provisions. FLA. S. JOUR. 670 (Reg. Sess. 1995). As amended, SB
2296 passed the Senate on May 2 by a vote of 38 to 0. Id. at 673. Thereafter, on May 4, after the
enactment of CS for HB 717 on May 2, the House of Representatives passed SB 2296, as amended
to include both FRUPA and the LLP provisions, by a vote of Il l to 0. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1283 (Reg.
Sess. 1995). The enrolled bill was sent to the Governor on May 5 and became law without his signa-
ture on June 9, 1995. FLA. LEaIS., HISTORY OF LEGSA'TION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BILLS at 165, SB 2296; see 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242. The effective date of the LLP provi-
sions was July 1, 1995. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, 2150, 2152.
The LLP provisions in the two bills were identical, except for their respective effective dates.
Chapter 95-242 supersedes Chapter 95-409, having been enacted subsequently by the Legislature.
Thus, the LLP provisions became effective July 1, 1995. See F.A. STAT. § 1.04 (1995); id. at viii
(Revisor's explanation in Preface).
6. See Robert R. Keatinge, George W. Coleman, Allan G. Donn & Elizabeth G. Hester,
Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business
Organization, 51 Bus. LAW 147, 148 (1995); ABA CoMrrEE ON PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCOR-
PORATED ORGANIZATIONS, 5 STATE LIMITED LIABILITY CoMPAmY & PARTNERSHIP LAWS § I (Mi-
chael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., 1995) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE TO LLPs]. The
latter contains an excellent commentary on LLPs generally, written by Elizabeth G. Hester, as
well as the text of the various state LLP statutes. See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RmsTEiN, LnrED LIABILrrY PARTNERSiHIS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1995)
[hereinafter BROMsERG & RIBsTErN ON LLPs].
7. The exculpatory provision itself usually amends the state's version of UPA § 15, which
provides that partners are personally liable for the partnership's debts and obligations. See, e.g.,
6 Del. Laws § 1515 (1995); IowA CODE § 486.15 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1995).
8. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3431 (1995); MICH. Comy. LAWS § 449.46 (1995); 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8204 (1994). For a general discussion of the structure of LLP provisions, see ABA
GuIDE TO LLPs, supra note 6, § 2.
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truly new era of partnership jurisprudence, both in the United States
and in Florida. This Article will explain the major changes in partner-
ship law wrought by the Revised Florida Act, identify the Florida
nonuniform provisions, 9 and consider the meaning and significance of
Florida's limited liability partnership legislation.
II. THE FLORIDA REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
A. Definition and Formation of a Partnership
Under the Revised Florida Act, as in the UPA, a partnership is de-
fined as an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit, except an association formed under any
other statute (such as a corporation or a limited liability company). 0
As under the UPA, no filing is required to form a partnership." Thus,
partnership remains the residual form of business association under
9. Since the Revised Florida Act is, for the most part, identical to the Revised Uniform
Act, the discussion and citation herein will be to FRUPA. Material nonuniform Florida amend-
ments will be discussed with appropriate citation to the Revised Uniform Act.
The Revised Florida Act is codified as part IV of chapter 620, sections 620.81001-.91, Florida
Statutes. The last three digits of the FRUPA section numbers correspond to the RUPA section
numbers, except that FRUPA subsections are numbered and paragraphs are lettered. For exam-
ple, section 620.8401(l)(b), Florida Statutes, corresponds to RUPA § 401(a)(2), and will be cited
herein as FRUPA § 401(l)(b).
10. The Uniform Partnership Act § 6 provides:
(1) A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit.
(2) But any association formed under any other statute of this state .. . is not a
partnership under this [Aict ... ; but this [A]ct shall apply to limited partnerships
except in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith.
The Revised Florida Act § 202 in part provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or
not the persons intend to form a partnership.
(2) An association formed under a statute, other than this [A]ct, a predecessor stat-
ute [i.e., the UPA], or a comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partner-
ship under this [Alct.
The Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1) serves a dual function. It is both the definition of "part-
nership," as well as the operative provision for the formation of a partnership. Critics frown on
statutory "definitions" serving such dual functions. Accordingly, FRUPA § 202 is the operative
provision, while FRUPA § 101(5) is definitional: " 'Partnership' means an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit formed under [§ 202], predecessor
law, or comparable law of another jurisdiction."
11. Florida provides for the registration of partnerships with the Department of State. See
FRUPA § 105(1). Registration is voluntary, in the sense that it is not required by law, but is a
condition precedent to the filing of other "statements," such as a statement of authority. See id.
§ 105(4). Therefore, registration is required of partnerships seeking the benefits of filed state-
ments. See discussion infra notes 76-97, 202-09, 219-21, 257-62 and accompanying text. Registra-
tion is a nonuniform Florida provision.
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FRUPA, which may result in a so-called "inadvertent partnership."
In stating that a partnership is formed, "whether or not the persons
intend to form a partnership," no substantive change is intended since
the FRUPA formulation codifies UPA case law which holds that the
requisite intent to the formation of a partnership is not the subjective
intention to be partners, but rather whether the parties intended "to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
2
One important change is intended, however. Limited partnerships
are not "partnerships" within the meaning of the Revised Florida Act
inasmuch as they are formed under the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (RULPA). 3 Nevertheless, FRUPA will continue to
govern limited partnerships because RULPA itself so requires "in any
case not provided for" in RULPA.'
4
The Revised Florida Act provides three rules for determining
whether a partnership has been formed. 5 As under the UPA, a part-
nership is presumed to exist if profits from a business are shared, un-
less the profit share has been received in payment of a debt, or as
wages, rent, or under any other enumerated relationship. 16 Profit
sharing by joint owners of property does not by itself establish a part-
nership, 7 nor does the sharing of gross returns.",
B. Partnership as an Entity
Although the law merchant had long accorded entity treatment to
partnerships, the common law did not recognize partnerships as legal
12. See RUPA § 202, cmt. 1.
13. See id. § 202, cmt. 2. UPA § 6(2) expressly provides that the UPA applies to limited
partnerships unless otherwise provided by the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976)
With The 1985 Amendments, 6A U.L.A. 1 (1995) (RULPA). RUPA § 202(b) provides no such
exception. Accord FRUPA § 202(2).
14. See RULPA § 1105. In light of that section, UPA § 6(2), providing that limited part-
nerships are governed by the UPA, has not been carried over to FRUPA. The Revised Florida
Act thus more properly allows RULPA to link FRUPA and RULPA. For clarity, the Florida
RULPA has been amended to read: "In any case not provided for in this act [RULPA], the
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act or the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, as applica-
ble, and the rules of law and equity shall govern." FLA. STAT. § 620.186 (1995) (as amended by
1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 22, 2150, 2189) (new text underlined). The new text is intended to
afford existing Florida limited partnerships the same deferred applicability date established by
1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 14, for existing general partnerships, absent an election to be
governed earlier by FRUPA. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
15. FRUPA § 202(3).
16. Id. § 202(3)(c). The sharing of profits is cast as a rebuttable presumption, rather than as
prima facie evidence. Compare UPA § 7(4). No substantive change is intended. See RUPA
§ 202, cmt. 3. One of the enumerated relationships covers a lender's receipt of profits under a
shared appreciation mortgage. See FRUPA § 202(3)(e).
17. Id. §-202(3)(a).
18. Id. § 202(3)(b).
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entities, but conceptualized them as the aggregate of the partners. 9
The UPA was somewhat ambivalent about the nature of a partner-
ship,20 but the aggregate notion continued to dominate legal analysis.2 '
The Revised Florida Act explicitly states that "a partnership is an en-
tity distinct from its partners, ' 2  greatly simplifying, among other
things, the continued existence of the partnership despite the depar-
ture of a partner. 23 One important attribute of the aggregate theory is
retained: partners remain jointly and severally liable for all of the
partnership's debts and obligations2A More importantly, partnerships
will continue to be accorded pass-through treatment for federal in-
come tax purposes, despite their entity characterization under state
law."
C. Default and Mandatory Rules
The Revised Florida Act continues in the partnership tradition that
most of the legal rules are not mandatory and can be varied by agree-
ment of the partners.s Thus, with few exceptions, FRUPA affords
great flexibility by allowing the partners to custom tailor the relation-
ship in the partnership agreement .2  The statute is the default contract
to the extent the partnership agreement does not provide otherwise.28
19. See JUDSON A. CRANE & ALAN R. BROMBERo, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 3, at 18-25
(1968).
20. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Urnu. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914), 6 U.L.A. 7
(1969); see also CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 19, § 3, at 26-29.
21. See MELVIN A. EISENBERO, AN INTRODUCTION To AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 38-39 (2d
ed. 1995); CRANE & BROMBERO, supra note 19, § 3, at 26-29.
22. FRUPA § 201.
23. See infra part II.G.
24. FRUPA § 306(1).
25. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7
(Mar. 29, 1995), in which the IRS proposes to discard the complex entity classification system
currently used to determine whether an unincorporated business entity, such as a limited partner-
ship or a limited liability company, is to be classified as a "partnership," entitled to pass-
through taxation, or as an "association," which must pay tax at the entity level as a corpora-
tion. Many unincorporated entities would like to be classified as a partnership to avoid two-
tiered taxation. The proposal has been well received. See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge, IRS Con-
siders End to Kintner Analysis of Unincorporated Associations, LLC ADVISOR (CCH), Apr.
1995, at 4; Daniel Shefter, Check the Box Partnership Classification: A Legitimate Exercise in
Tax Simplification, 95 TAx NOTES TODAY, Apr. 13, 1995, at 72-44; see generally Daniel S. Gold-
berg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law in Search of Policy, 50 Bus.
LAW. 995 (1995).
26. Most of the UPA rules may be varied by agreement of the partners. See, e.g., UPA § 18
("The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject
to any agreement between them, by the following rules.
27. FRUPA § 103(1).
28. Id.
1995]
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There are only nine exceptions. 29 Florida adds a tenth exception.30
One exception 3' continues the UPA rule that a partner may withdraw
voluntarily from the partnership at any time, even in contravention of
the partnership agreement.12 Other exceptions proscribe the complete
elimination of a partner's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and ob-
ligation of good faith and fair dealing, but permit the partners to vary
contractually the standard of conduct required, if not unreasonable. 3
The final "exception," which provides that the rights of third parties
under the Act may not be restricted in the partnership agreement,3 4 is
something of a misnomer; it simply restates the inherent limitation
that only parties to a contract are bound by the contract.
Constrained only by these few exceptions, partners are free to ar-
range their internal affairs.3" The Revised Florida Act provides an ar-
ray of standard terms that may be "selected" by the parties without
incurring further negotiating and drafting costs and that will be im-
posed on them if they fail to provide otherwise in their partnership
agreement. There are advantages to using the standard language. To
the extent that the Act's default rules satisfy the needs of the parties,
the statutory regime is efficient. Furthermore, the meaning of stan-
dard terms will be less uncertain than unique contract terms drafted
by the parties.
6
29. RUPA § 103(b). All nine exceptions are clearly identified and conveniently enumerated
in that section.
30. See FRUPA § 103(2)(g) (providing that the partnership agreement may not change the
notice provisions contained in FRUPA §§ 902(6) and 905(6), themselves additional nonuniform
requirements for the Article 9 "safe harbor" for partnership conversions and mergers); infra
notes 222-24 and accompanying text. Articulating those notice requirements as immutable rules
misperceives the concept of a "safe harbor." As FRUPA § 908 makes clear, the Article 9
"rules" are not exclusive, and partnerships may be converted or merged in any other manner
provided by law. The benefit of complying with the "safe harbor" requirements is merely the
comfort of knowing that the transaction is valid and has the legal consequences set forth in the
Act.
FRUPA § 103(2) was mysteriously edited in the legislative process, so that the uniform excep-
tions found in RUPA § 103(b)(1)-(3) are lumped irrationally together in FRUPA § 103(2)(a)1-3
and the remaining exceptions are redesignated (b) through (h). It appears that no substantive
change is intended, and the section's uniform structure would be restored by House Bill 1043, a
so-called "glitch bill" that has already been introduced in the 1996 Legislative Session by Repre-
sentative Livingston.
31. FRUPA § 103(2)(d).
32. See UPA § 31(2); FRUPA § 602(1). As under UPA § 38(2)(a), a partner who has
wrongfully withdrawn in contravention of the agreement is liable for any damages caused by
breach of the agreement. See FRUPA § 602(3).
33. FRUPA §§ 103(2)(a)3, (b), (c), discussed infra notes 122-24, 132, 135 and accompany-
ing text.
34. FRUPA § 103(2)(h).
35. The Revised Uniform Act thus provides off-the-rack standard contract terms that may
be utilized by the parties without the cost of further negotiation and drafting.
36. One of the primary benefits of a "uniform" law is that a richer body of case law will be
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The Act's default rules were drafted for a small, informal partner-
ship, in which all of the partners are active and contribute both money
and human capital. The Revised Uniform Act attempts to provide a
body of default rules that are similar to those that would be crafted by
partnership lawyers seeking to provide a commercially reasonable and
efficient organizational structure. To the extent that a partnership dif-
fers from the paradigm or the parties' preferences diverge from the
norm, different rules may be more appropriate.
D. Filing and Effect of Partnership Statements
One of the Revised Florida Act's major innovations is a regime of
voluntary filed statements37 containing certain basic information
about a partnership, such as who has the authority to transfer or
mortgage partnership real property?8 The drafters of the Revised Uni-
form Act believed it likely that filing would become routine for many
partnerships and would be required by sophisticated lenders because
reliance on filed statements affords greater certainty in partnership
transactions, at minimal cost and inconvenience.39 That may not be
the case in Florida because of a cumbersome nonuniform
requirement4 and the availability of a familiar alternative for many
transactions .
41
The drafters of RUPA contemplated that the filing of partnership
statements would be similar to Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) fil-
ings. Filing would be statewide, probably in the office of the Secretary
of State, whose only duty would be to index filed statements in the
name of the partnership as indicated on the statement. Filing fees
would be modest, and responsibility for the accuracy of the statement
and determination of its legal effect would be left entirely to the par-
ties.
developed construing its meaning, especially those terms that suffer from some ambiguity. Uni-
form language is also the subject of scholarly debate, leading to a better understanding of its
nuance of meaning.
37. The Revised Florida Act authorizes a partnership to file the following statements: 1) a
statement of partnership authority under FRUPA § 303; 2) a statement of denial under FRUPA
§ 304; 3) a statement of dissociation under FRUPA § 704; 4) a statement of dissolution under
FRUPA § 805; and 5) a statement of merger under FRUPA § 907. The term "statement" is
defined to mean those statements, or an amendment or cancellation thereof. FRUPA § 101(13).
The filing of such statements is entirely voluntary. See, e.g., id. §§ 105(1), 303(1) (statement of
partnership authority).
38. See generally Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAw. 1, 34 (1993) [hereinafter Reporters' Overview].
39. See RUPA § 105, cmt. 1.
40. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 689.045 (1995), discussed infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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The Revised Florida Act, while not mandating that all partnerships
register with the Department of State, 42 nevertheless requires registra-
tion as a condition precedent to the filing of most partnership state-
ments, including a statement of partnership authority. 43 Registration
effectively increases the cost of partnership filings and may at times be
intrusive. The filing fee for a registration statement is $50, while the
fee for other statements is $25. 44 A certified copy of a filed statement,
which is required for recording transfers of real property, '4 costs
$52.50.46 While those fees are modest with respect to a large transac-
tion, they may discourage the routine use of statements by smaller
partnerships .47
E. Partnership Property
1. Nature of Partnership Property
The Revised Florida Act's entity approach has greatly simplified the
rules regarding the nature and transfer of partnership property. Dis-
carding the UPA's confusing concept of tenancy in partn6rship,
FRUPA provides simply, "Property acquired by a partnership is
property of the partnership and not of the partners individually."4
As tenants in partnership, each partner is a co-owner with the other
partners of an undivided interest in specific partnership property, 49
but without most of the usual incidents of ownership, such as the
right to possess the property for non-partnership purposes ° or the
42. The Revised Florida Act § 105(1) provides that a partnership "may" file a registration
statement with the Department of State. A "registration statement" is not a "statement" within
the meaning of that term. Compare FRUPA § 101(11) ("registration" or "registration state-
ment") with § 101(13) ("statement").
43. FRUPA § 105(4). A "statement" may be filed with the Department of State only if the
partnership has filed a registration statement, except those statements provided for by FRUPA
§ 304 (statement of denial) or § 704 (statement of dissociation). Id. § 105(4). Thus, a statement
of dissolution may not be filed under § 304 unless the partnership had been previously regis-
tered.
The Department of State is authorized to adopt administrative rules as necessary to carry out
its duties and functions under the Act. FRUPA § 1055(2). Official forms of partnership state-
ments have been adopted. See SANDRA B. MORTHAM, SECRETARY OF STATE, PARNERSHnMs IN
FLORIDA (1995).
44. FRUPA § 1055(l). The fee for filing a UCC financing statement (Form UCC-I) is also
$25. FLA. STAT. § 15.091(I)(a) (1995).
45. See FRUPA § 105(8).
46. Id. § 1055(l)(i).
47. FLA. STAT. § 689.045 (1995), discussed infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
48. FRUPA § 203.
49. See UPA § 25(1). Tenancy in partnership reflects the aggregate theory of partnership.
See Reporters' Overview, supra note 38, at 28.
50. UPA § 25(2)(a).
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right to alienate the partner's interest in specific partnership
property . 5 The change in theory is underscored further by the express
negation of a partner's co-ownership of specific partnership assets:
"Partnership property is owned by the partnership as an entity, not
by the partners as co-owners. A partner has no interest that can be
transferred, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in specific partnership
property."1 2 Only a partner's economic interest in the partnership as a
whole is transferable. 3 As under the UPA, that interest is conclusively
deemed to be personal property, without regard to the nature of spe-
cific partnership property. 4
2. Transfer of Partnership Property
Another advantage of the entity theory is the certainty of ownership
afforded partnership property and the rules regarding its transfer. The
Revised Florida Act draws a distinction between property acquired
"in the name of the partnership" and other partnership property.
Property acquired in the name of the partnership is conclusively
deemed to be partnership property," and the rules regarding the trans-
fer of property held of record by the partnership are explicit,5 6
51. Id. §§ 25(2)(b), (c). By defining the "incidents of this tenancy" in a manner that denies
individual partners the usual incidents of ownership, the UPA reaches an entity result masquer-
ading in aggregate terms, For example, a partner may not grant a security interest in specific
partnership property to a personal creditor. In re O'Connell, 119 B.R. 311, 314 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1990).
52. FRUPA § 501. The Revised Uniform Act § 501 provides: "A partner is not a co-owner
of partnership property and has no interest in partnership property which can be transferred,
either voluntarily or involuntarily." The Florida modification merely emphasizes the change
from the UPA; no substantive change from RUPA is intended.
53. "The only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner's share of
the profits and losses of the partnership and the partner's right to receive distributions."
FRUPA § 502. A "distribution" is "a transfer of money or other property from a partnership to
a partner in the partner's capacity as a partner .... " Id. § 101(4). A partner's "transferable
interest" is to be distinguished from the partner's "partnership interest." The latter means "all
of a partner's interests in the partnership, including the partner's transferable interest and all
management and other rights," such as a partner's information rights. Id. § 101(8) (emphasis
added). Those rights, including the right to participate in management, are not transferable, but
are conferred only if the transferee is admitted as a partner.
54. FRUPA § 502, second sentence, which reads: "A partner's interest in the partnership is
personal property" (emphasis added). That is a slight change from RUPA § 502, which reads,
"The only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner's share of the prof-
its and losses of the partnership and the partner's right to receive distributions. The interest is
personal property." A partner's interest in the partnership is not the same as her transferable
interest. See supra note 53. The Florida comment indicates the change was intended to clarify
that a partner's entire interest in the partnership is personal property, not merely her transferable
interest. The clarification seems unnecessary, especially in light of UPA precedent, and is out of
place in a section entitled "Partner's transferable interest in partnership."
55. FRUPA § 204(l)(a).
56. Id. § 302(1).
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enhancing reliance on record title for the benefit of both partners and
third parties. Moreover, FRUPA expressly extends the protection of
record title to personal property acquired in the name of the partner-
ship." Property is acquired "in the name of the partnership" by a
transfer to: 1) the partnership in its name or 2) one or more partners
in their capacity as partners, if the name of the partnership is indi-
cated in the instrument of transfer." In either case, the partnership's
interest can be ascertained from the applicable title records or instru-
ments transferring title.
Property not acquired in the name of the partnership may also be
partnership property. Property acquired in the name of one or more
of the partners with an indication in the instrument of conveyance of
either 1) the transferee's "capacity as a partner" or 2) "the existence
of a partnership but without an indication of the name of the partner-
ship" is deemed conclusively to be partnership property. 59 Such con-
veyances evidence the partners' intention that property so acquired is
partnership property, and third parties are alerted by the record to a
possible partnership interest in the property.
Furthermore, as under prior law, 6° property that is acquired in the
name of one or more of the partners without any record indication of
the partnership's interest may nevertheless be partnership property,
subject to two rebuttable presumptions: 1) property purchased with
partnership assets is presumed to be partnership property; 6 and 2)
property purchased without use of partnership assets is presumed to
be the partner's separate property, even if used for partnership pur-
poses. 62 Ultimately, it is a question of fact whether the partners in-
tended that property acquired in the name of a partner, without any
indication of the partnership's interest, would belong to the partner-
ship or to the named partner individually. 63
57. Id. Under UPA § 8(3), real property may be acquired in the partnership name, but the
Act is silent regarding personal property. See RUPA § 302, cmt. 2.
58. FRUPA § 204(2). Therefore, the deed or certificate of title by which the partnership
acquires the property must indicate the correct name of the partnership. Otherwise, reliance on
the record title is unwarranted.
59. FRUPA § 204(l)(b).
60. UPA § 8 see, e.g., Standring v. Standring, 794 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Colo. App. 1990).
61. FRUPA § 204(3) (continuing the presumption in UPA § 8(2) that "property acquired
with partnership funds" is partnership property) (emphasis added). The RUPA presumption is
expanded to cover property purchased with partnership "assets," which is intended to apply if
the firm's credit is used to obtain financing. RUPA § 204, cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
62. FRUPA § 204(4). In effect, the Act presumes that the partner is contributing the use of
the property to the partnership, not the property itself. See RUPA § 204, cmt. 3.
63. The intention of the parties is controlling, at least as among the partners. See id.
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3. Partner's Agency Authority
The Revised Florida Act does not alter a partner's general agency
authority to bind the partnership, with one very important qualifica-
tion. 61 The Act provides that, subject to the effect of a statement of
partnership authority, a partner has both actual and apparent author-
ity to bind the partnership by acts, including the execution of an in-
strument in the partnership name, in the ordinary course of business.
6
Statements of authority aside, partners may limit a partner's actual
authority6 even in ordinary course matters or they may expand a part-
ner's actual authority by authorizing acts beyond the ordinary course
of business.67 If a partner's actual authority to act in the ordinary
64. UPA § 9(l).
65. FRUPA § 301(1). Under the UPA, a partner's apparent authority is limited to "carry-
ing on in the usual way the business of the partnership." UPA § 9(1). The Revised Florida Act
clarifies that a partner's apparent authority extends to acts done in the ordinary course of busi-
ness "of the kind carried on by the partnership." FRUPA § 301(1). Florida adds the nonuni-
form qualification: "in the geographic area in which the partnership operates." Id. That seems
implicit in the uniform act, and no substantive change is intended. See FRUPA § 301, Fla. cmt.
THE FLORIDA BAR, CoNTPIwNG LEGAL EDUC. Comm., FLORIDA PArNERSnw LAW 31 (1995)
[hereinafter FLORIDA BAR CLE oN PARTNERsmw LAW. The Florida comment to FRUPA are not
official, but were prepared by The Florida Bar Drafting Committe (see supra note 4) to explain
its proposed nonuniform amendments to RUPA. The comments accompanied the draft bill sub-
mitted to the Florida legislature and thus constitute part of FRUPA's legislative history, albeit
unofficial. The Florida comments accompany the statutory text of the Revised Florida Act
found in The Florida Bar's materials.
66. FRUPA § 301(1) states, "Each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of
its business .... To the extent that is the default scope of each partner's actual authority, it
may be varied in the partnership agreement as provided in FRUPA § 103(1). To the extent that it
also defines the scope of each partner's apparent authority, a third party is not bound by an
unknown restriction on a partner's authority unless the limitation is contained in a recorded
statement of authority, as provided in FRUPA § 303.
67. The Revised Uniform Act § 301(2) provides that the partnership is bound by a partner's
act beyond the ordinary course of business "only if the act was authorized by the other part-
ners." Under RUPA § 401(j), an act outside the ordinary course of business may be undertaken
only with the consent of all of the partners, unless the partnership agreement provides for less
than unanimous consent. Thus, "authorization by the other partners" under RUPA § 301(2)
requires unanimous consent unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise.
That result may be changed by FRUPA, which provides that the partnership is bound only if a
partner's extraordinary act was "authorized by all of the other partners or is authorized by the
terms of a written partnership agreement." FRUPA § 301(2) (emphasis added). According to the
Florida comment, the change was intended to make the RUPA rule "particularly clear."
FRUPA § 301, Fla. cmt. FLORIDA BAR CLE oN PARTNERs-mp LAW, supra note 65, at 31. Unfor-
tunately, the requirement of a written partnership agreement conflicts with the general rule re-
specting partnership agreements, "whether written, oral, or implied." FRUPA § 101(6).
Moreover, it is unclear under the Florida formulation whether the act itself must be "authorized
by the terms of a written partnership agreement" or whether the act may, as contemplated by
RUPA, be authorized by less than unanimous consent if so provided in the partnership agree-
ment. rf the concern is that the partnership should not be bound by a partner's extraordinary act
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course of the partnership's business is limited, the partnership may
still be bound by the partner's apparent authority unless the other
party "knew or had received a notification" 61 of the partner's lack of
authority.
69
Promoting reliance on the record chain of title to property held in
the name of the partnership (including titled personal property, as
well as real property), FRUPA clarifies the UPA's rules70 governing
the transfer of partnership real property by providing that, absent a
filed statement of authority, every partner has the authority to trans-
fer property held in the name of the partnership. 71 To avoid a part-
ner's unauthorized transfer and recover the property, the partnership
unless clearly authorized by the other partners, it is somewhat ameliorated by the burden of
proof. Under general agency principles, preserved by FRUPA § 104(l), the burden of proof is
on a third party who claims that an agent has authority to act beyond the ordinary course of the
principal's business. See, e.g., General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int'l, Inc., 542 F. Supp.
684, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799, 803 (Or. 1967).
Finally, it should be noted that the partnership may be bound under FRUPA § 303(3)(a) by a
partner's act that is within a grant of extraordinary authority contained in a filed statement of
partnership authority, whether or not authorized by all of the other partners, since the § 301
rules are subject to the effect of a statement of authority under § 303.
68. See FRUPA § 102(2) (meaning of "knows"); id. § 102(4) (meaning of "receives a noti-
fication").
69. Id. § 301(1). Under FRUPA § 102(1), a person "knows" a fact if she has actual knowl-
edge of it. Thus, knowledge means cognitive awareness and is a question of fact. See RUPA
§ 102, cmt. A person "receives a notification" when it comes to her attention or is duly deliv-
ered at the person's place of business or at any other place held out as a place for receiving
communications, whether or not the person actually learns of the communication. FRUPA
§ 102(4).
Under FRUPA, a person has "notice" of a fact if she knows or has received a notification of
the fact or if she has reason to know it exists from all of the facts known to her at the time in
question. Id. § 102(2). Thus, "notice" includes the traditional concept of inquiry notice and
requires reasonable diligence when triggered by known facts. The FRUPA definitions are based
on those found in UCC §§ 1-201(25)-(27) (1989) (UCC). See RUPA § 102, cmt.
Under FRUPA § 301(1), the partnership is bound by a partner's apparent authority unless the
other party knows or has received a notification of the partner's lack of authority; notice is not
enough. That marginally shifts the allocation of risk of a partner's lack of authority to the
partnership, which ought to bear the risk of a rogue partner acting in the ordinary course of
business, but without actual authority. Compare UPA § 9(1), which provides that the partner-
ship is bound unless the other party has "knowledge" of the lack of authority; UPA § 3(1),
however, defines "knowledge" to include "knowledge of such other facts as in the circum-
stances shows bad faith." Under FRUPA, the partnership cannot avoid liability by asserting the
other party failed to inquire about the partner's authority. To protect itself, the partnership may
send a notification of a partner's lack of authority to persons dealing with that partner.
70. UPA § 10.
71. FRUPA § 302(l)(a). As FRUPA § 302(2) makes clear, however, that authority is sub-
ject to the FRUPA § 301 general rules governing a partner's authority. Thus, each partner has
apparent and, unless restricted, actual authority to execute conveyances for the transfer in the
ordinary course of business of property held in the name of the partnership, but a partner's
authority to transfer such property beyond the ordinary course of business must be actual. See
FRUPA § 301.
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must prove that the partner lacked both actual and apparent author-
ity.
72
Partnership property held in the name of one or more partners may
be transferred by an instrument of transfer executed by partners in
whose name the property is held, whether or not there is a record indi-
cation of their capacity as partners or of the existence of a partner-
ship . 7 To recover such property transferred without authority, the
partnership must prove that the partner executing the conveyance
lacked authority, actual or apparent, and, if there was no record indi-
cation of a possible partnership interest in the property, that the trans-
feree knew (or had received a notification) that the property was
partnership property.74
4. Effect of a Statement of Partnership Authority
The UPA provides no convenient means of establishing on the rec-
ord that partners have the authority to execute instruments of convey-
ance on behalf of the partnership. Therefore, costly and cumbersome
practices to evidence partnership authority were developed, especially
with respect to the transfer of real property. 7 The most important
goal of the Revised Florida Act's new system of filed statements, and
particularly the statement of partnership authority, is to provide a
more convenient, efficient, and reliable means of establishing part-
ners' record authority with respect to the transfer of real property
held in the name of the partnership.
76
Under FRUPA, a partnership may file a statement of partnership
authority naming those partners authorized to execute an instrument
72. Id. § 302(2). The burden of proof is on the partnership. See RUPA § 302, cmt. 3. If the
initial transferee of the partnership property has, in turn, transferred the property to a purchaser
for value, the partnership must also prove that the subsequent transferee knew or had received a
notification that the partner executing the instrument of initial transfer lacked authority.
FRUPA § 302(2)(a). The partnership may not recover the property from a subsequent transferee
if any prior transferee in the chain of title would have prevailed over the partnership. Id.
§ 302(3).
73. Id. §§ 302(l)(b) (indication), (c) (no indication).
74. Id. § 302(2)(b). That additional requirement protects only transferees for value.
75. For example, grantees from the partnership and lenders often require that deeds and
mortgages be executed by all of the partners or that affidavits of authority be executed and
recorded. See Edward S. Merrill, Partnership Property and Partnership Authority Under the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 49 Bus. LAW. 83, 95 (1994).
Florida has long had a nonuniform provision that somewhat simplifies establishing of record a
partner's authority to execute instruments of conveyance of partnership real property. See FLA.
STAT. § 620.605(1) (1995), discussed infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
76. See RUPA § 303, cmit. 2. In Florida, a partnership's eligibility to file and record a
statement of authority is conditioned on its prior registration with the Department of State.
FRUPA § 105(4), discussed supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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transferring real property held in the name of the partnership' and
specifying the authority, or limitations on the authority, of some or
all of the partners to enter into other transactions on behalf of the
partnership. 7 Under the Revised Florida Act, a partnership may not
file a statement of authority unless the partnership has previously filed
a registration statement with the Department of State.7 9 The registra-
tion statement must include the names and mailing addresses of all of
the partners or the name and address of an agent appointed by the
partnership who will maintain a partners' list and, on request, make it
available to any person showing good cause.so
To be effective, any statement filed on behalf of the partnership
must be executed by at least two partners. 8' A copy of all statements
filed must be sent promptly to every non-filing partner and to any
other person named as a partner in the statement. 2 To be effective
with respect to real property, a certified copy of the statement 3 must
77. FRUPA § 303(1)(a) (emphasis added).
78. Id. § 303(l)(b). The statement may include any other matter the partnership chooses.
79. This nonuniform amendment is found in FRUPA § 105(4).
80. Id. § 105(l)(c); cf. RUPA § 303(a). The registration statement must also include the
partnership's name; the street address of its "chief executive office," and principal Florida of-
fice, if there is one; the partnership's Federal Employer Identification Number; and the recorded
document number of each partner that is a business entity rather than a natural person. FRUPA
99 105(I)(a), (b), (d), (e).
Under RUPA, there is no provision for the "registration" of partnerships. However, a state-
ment of authority must include the name of the partnership, The street address of its chief execu-
tive office and of an office in the state, if any, as well as the names and mailing addresses of all
of the partners or of an agent appointed by the partnership to maintain a list of the partners'
names and addresses, available to any person on request for good cause shown. RUPA
§§ 303(a)(1)(il), (lii), (b).
Traditionally, public disclosure of partners' names has not been required by law, and so-called
silent partners are common. Thus, disclosure of the identity of all the partners is, in effect, a
"tax" on the right to use partnership statements; the underlying policy of the requirement is not
readily apparent, however. Under FRUPA § 303(2), failure to disclose the names of the partners
does not impair a filed statement's operative effect, provided the statement is properly executed
and states the name of the partnership. The reference in that section to FRUPA § 105(3) is in
error; it should refer to FRUPA § 105(6). Compare RUPA § 303(c). The error will be corrected
in the "glitch bill."
81. FRUPA j 105(6). That is a compromise between the security of requiring all or a ma-
jority of the partners to sign and the convenience of a single partner. Presumably, a registration
statement must also be signed by at least two partners, although § 105(6) applies only to "state-
ments," and a registration statement is not within the FRUPA § 101(13) definition of a "state-
ment." See supra note 42.
82. FRUPA § 105(9). Failure to send a copy of a statement to a partner or other person
does not limit its operative effect. Id.
83. Id. § 105(8). A recorded statement that is not a certified copy of a statement filed with
the iepartment of State does not have the effect provided for recorded statements in the Act.
Id. This provision avoids inconsistencies between statements affecting the title to real property.
See RUPA § 105, cmt. 3.
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be recorded in the office for recording transfers of real property. 4
Statements may be amended or canceled, 5 and the accuracy of any
statement may be denied.' 6
a. Transfers of Real Property
The legal effect of a statement of authority differs markedly de-
pending on the nature of the transaction. Most significantly, the Re-
vised Florida Act affords almost absolute protection to both the
partnership and transferees with respect to the authority of a partner
to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership. 7
First, a grant of authority to one or more of the partners to transfer
real property held in the name of the partnership is conclusive in favor
of a purchaser for value unless either 1) a limitation on that authority
is then of record or 2) the purchaser has knowledge of the partner's
actual lack of authority." Since every partner has at least apparent
84. In Florida, the clerk of the circuit court is the recorder of all instruments authorized by
law to be recorded, including instruments relating to the transfer of real property located in the
county. FLA. STAT. § 28.222(1) (1995). All instruments are recorded in one general series of
books called the "Official Records." Id. § 28.222(2). Unless recorded, a transfer of real prop-
erty is not effective against creditors or subsequent purchasers for value and without notice. See
id. § 695.01(1).
85. FRUPA § 105(7). Unless canceled earlier, a statement of authority is canceled by opera-
tion of law after five years. Id. § 303(6).
86. Id. § 304. A statement of denial is a limitation on authority as provided in FRUPA
§ 303(3) and (4), the operative effect of which is discussed infra in notes 90-91 and accompany-
ing text. See FRUPA § 304(3). The references in that section to FRUPA § 303(5) and (6) are in
error. The references should be to FRUPA § 303(3) and (4). Compare RUPA § 304. This error
will be corrected in the "glitch bill." A statement of denial may be filed even if the partnership is
not registered. See FRUPA § 304(2). The significance of this rule is minimal, inasmuch as the
only other statement that may be filed without the partnership having been registered is a state-
ment of dissociation. See id. §§ 105(4), 704(2).
87. A recorded statement has no legal effect on the authority of a partner to transfer part-
nership real property not held in the name of the partnership.
88. FRUPA § 303(3)(b). A statement of authority is accorded that effect only if it is prop-
erly recorded in the local real estate records. Id.
A recorded grant of authority is given conclusive effect only "so long as and to the extent that
a certified copy of a filed statement containing a limitation on that authority is not then of
record." Id. Thus, reliance on a partner's record authority is confined to situations in which
there is no conflict among the recorded statements and amendments. A statement of denial also
operates as a limitation on authority. Id. § 304. If the record is in conflict, the partner's actual
authority must be determined outside the record. See RUPA § 303, cmt. 2. A cancellation of a
limitation on a partner's authority, however, revives the previous grant of authority, so inadver-
tent conflicts can be resolved and reliance on the record restored. FRUPA § 303(3)(b) (last sen-
tence).
Record authority is conclusive only if the transferee is "without knowledge to the contrary,"
that is, actual knowledge of a partner's lack of authority. See id. § 102(1). Thus, transferees are
under no obligation to inquire, even if alerted to possible defects, since "notice" of a lack of
authority does not preclude the record presumption of authority. See id. § 102(2). Sending a
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authority to transfer real property in the ordinary course of the part-
nership's business, a statement of authority is most crucial in the
transfer of partnership realty outside the ordinary course of business.
In that situation, absent record authority, a transferee has the burden
of proving that the partner had actual authority to execute the instru-
ment of conveyance. s9
Not only is the partnership bound by a recorded grant of authority
to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership, but third
parties are deemed conclusively to know of a properly recorded limita-
tion on a partner's authority to transfer such property. 9° In this way, a
partnership can protect itself from unauthorized property transfers by
rogue partners acting within their apparent authority. Absent a re-
corded limitation, every partner has apparent authority to transfer
partnership property in the ordinary course of the partnership's busi-
ness, unless the transferee knows (or has received a notification) of a
partner's lack of authority. 9' In effect, a recorded limitation of au-
thority is conclusive as to the whole world's knowledge of the limita-
tion.
Like grants of authority, recorded limitations are given binding ef-
fect only with respect to a partner's authority to transfer real property
held in the name of the partnership.9 The authority of a partner to
transfer partnership real property not held in the name of the partner-
ship is entirely unaffected by recorded statements. 3
b. Other Transactions
With respect to all transactions other than the transfer of real prop-
erty, statements of authority are accorded more limited effect. A filed
notification of a partner's lack of authority to a transferee is insufficient, unless it actually
comes to the transferee's attention. Compare id. § 301(1) (apparent authority unless other party
knew or received a notification).
89. See id. § 301(2), discussed supra note 67 and accompanying text.
90. FRUPA § 303(4).
91. See id. § 301(1).
92. If partnership property is held in the name of one or more of the partners, with or
without an indication of the partner's partnership capacity or of a partnership's interest in the
property, a search of the record would not reveal the partnership's interest, and thus reliance on
the record would be unwarranted. To be protected from unauthorized transfers, therefore, a
partnership must acquire and hold its real property in its own name.
Titled personal property is not accorded the same protection as real property because reliance
on record title may not be appropriate. A filed limitation on a partner's authority might, how-
ever, be a source of actual knowledge of the partner's lack of authority, thereby cutting off the
partner's apparent authority under FRUPA § 301(1).
93. That is not affirmatively stated in the Act, but is the negative implication of FRUPA
§ 303(3)(a), which covers the effect of a recorded statement "except for transfers of real prop-
erty," and § 303(3)(b), which covers the effect with respect to the transfer of real property held
in the name of the partnership. By its terms, § 303(4) applies only to limitations of authority to
transfer real property held in the name of the partnership.
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grant of authority is generally binding on the partnership, while a lim-
itation on authority, in and of itself, has no legal effect.9 Specifically,
a grant of authority is conclusive in favor of a person who gives value
without actual knowledge to the contrary, absent a recorded limita-
tion. 95 Thus, the partnership is bound by a filed grant of extraordinary
authority authorizing a partner to act beyond the usual course of busi-
ness, unless the other party knows that the partner actually lacks such
authority. A third party may rely on such a grant and has no duty to
inquire further. However, third parties are not "deemed to know of a
limitation" (apart from real property transactions) on the authority of
a partner "merely because the limitation is contained in a filed state-
ment" of authority.9 Therefore, despite a limitation contained in a
filed statement of authority, a partner continues to have at least ap-
parent authority to act for the partnership in the ordinary course of
the partnership's business, unless the other party actually knows (or
has received a notification) of the limitation.9 7 A third party may,
however, actually learn of a filed limitation and thus know of the
partner's lack of authority.
5. Revised Section 689.045, Florida Statutes
The Florida UPA has long contained a nonuniform provision in-
tended to simplify establishing of record the authority to transfer real
property held in the partnership name. 98 Despite the enactment of
FRUPA's comprehensive system of recorded statements and the virtu-
ally absolute effect of those statements in determining of record a
partner's authority to transfer real property held in the name of the
partnership, the old Florida provision has been retained. Thus,
94. FRUPA § 303(5).
95. Id. § 303(3)(a).
96. Id. § 303(5). That is not true of limitations contained in a statement of dissociation or
dissolution, which are in effect exceptions to the general principle embodied in FRUPA § 303(5).
See id. §§ 704(4), 805(3), discussed infra notes 202-09, 219-21 and accompanying text.
97. FRUPA § 301(1). Thus, there is no need for third parties to monitor the Department of
State's partnership records in order to protect themselves from a limitation contained in a filed
statement of authority. But see infra text accompanying note 221 (discussing the need to monitor
records for limitations based on a statement of dissociation or dissolution).
98. See FLA. STAT. § 620.605(1) (1995). The provision was added to UPA § 10(1) at the time
Florida adopted the UPA. See 1972, Fla. Laws ch. 72-108, § 10, 351, 354. Section 620.605(1)
provides:
When title is held in the partnership name and it is necessary to identify the partners at
the time of a conveyance, encumbrance, or other instrument affecting partnership real
property, one of the partners may execute an affidavit stating the names of the part-
ners and that they are the partners then existing. The affidavit shall be conclusive as to
the facts therein stated as to purchasers without notice.
FLA. STAT. § 620.605(1)(1995).
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partnerships and their transferees have a choice as to the means used
to establish the authority of a partner to transfer real property held in
the name of the partnership.
As amended and relocated in section 689.045(3), Florida Statutes,9
the alternative provision reads as follows:
When title to real property is held in the name of a limited
partnership or a general partnership, one of the general partners may
execute and record, in the public records of the county in which such
partnership's real property is located, an affidavit stating the names
of the general partners then existing and the authority of any general
partner to execute a conveyance, encumbrance, or other instrument
affecting such partnership's real property. The affidavit shall be
conclusive as to the facts therein stated as to purchasers without
notice.
Resort to section 689.045 has one distinct advantage: an affidavit
may be filed and given effect even if the partnership is not registered
with the Department of State. Filing an affidavit saves the cost and
inconvenience of registration, as well as the higher fees for filing and
recording statements under FRUPA. Moreover, Florida real property
lawyers are undoubtedly more familiar and comfortable with section
689.045.
On *the other hand, F.R A's system of statements is both more
precise and more comprehensive. Section 689.045 does not seem to
contemplate the recording of a limitation on authority, nor does it
provide for amendment or cancellation or for a statement of denial if
another partner believes the affidavit to be in error. And were such an
inconsistent affidavit recorded, section 689.045 does not provide for a
resolution of the conflict between them. The precise effect to be ac-
corded a section 689.045 affidavit is also unclear, especially the con-
clusive effect, under FRUPA, of a grant of authority "as to
purchasers without notice." 100 Finally, there is no provision governing
99. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 23, 2150, 2189. Chapter 689, Florida Statutes, is entitled
Conveyances of Land and Declarations of Trust. For the original text of § 620.605(1), Florida
Statutes, see supra note 98.
100. First, it is unclear what the purchaser must not have notice of, although presumably it is
that the partner does not, in fact, enjoy the authority stated in the affidavit. More difficult,
however, is the meaning and effect of such notice. FRUPA distinguishes between "knowledge"
and "notice" and uses the two concepts carefully. See FRUPA §§ 102(1) (knowledge), 102(2)
(notice). If the FRUPA concept of "notice" is used in applying § 689.045, it affords less protec-
tion to a purchaser than does FRUPA § 303(3)(b). Under FRUPA, a purchaser may rely on a
partner's record authority unless the purchaser actually knows the partner lacks authority. Con-
versely, under § 689.045, a purchaser may not rely if she has reason to know of the partner's
lack of authority because of what is known.
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the interplay between a section 689.045 affidavit and the FRUPA re-
gime, such as a recorded limitation on authority under FRUPA that
conflicts with the authority conferred by a section 689.045 affidavit.
Because of this uncertainty, which is anathema with respect to the
title to real property, it seems likely that title companies and lenders
will prefer the FRUPA regime, and thus it may soon eclipse continued
reliance on section 689.045 affidavits. Also, as RUPA gains national
adoption, foreign purchasers and lenders will undoubtedly insist on
the FRUPA regime because it will be better understood. 0,
F. Partner's Rights and Duties
1. Fiduciary Duties
One of the most controversial provisions in RUPA is the provision
governing the fiduciary duties of partners.*°0 That controversy is more
likely attributable to RUPA's attempt to articulate those duties
clearly, rather than to any substantive changes wrought by the new
Act. The UPA says little about a partner's fiduciary duties, 03 and
most of the present law regarding a partner's fiduciary duties was ju-
dicially imported from the law of agency. 104 Thus, the substantive
rules developed by the courts are not completely uniform and, per-
haps more telling to the current debate, have not been articulated us-
ing a uniform or consistent analytical framework. For example, in the
oft-cited case of Meinhard v. Salmon,1°s Justice Cardozo eloquently
explained:
[Partners] owe to one another . the duty of finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
101. In time, the FRUPA regime should far surpass § 689.045 in certainty because of the
national body of case law construing the provision. There are no Florida cases construing the
affidavit provision of § 620.605(1).
102. See infra note 108-13 and accompanying text.
103. Uniform Partnership Act § 21 is entitled "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary" and is
the only section dealing with such duties. The text of the UPA itself does not use the word
"fiduciary."
104. Uniform Partnership Act § 4(3) provides that the law of agency shall apply under that
Act. "Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business." UPA § 9(1);
FRUPA § 3010). The law of partnership reflects the broader law of principal and agent, under
which every agent is a fiduciary. RUPA § 404, cmt. 1; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 13 (1957).
105. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive is then the standard of behavior.
Of course, partners are not trustees, in the strict sense, and despite the
colorful rhetoric the holding of the case was quite modest. Salmon,
the managing partner of a term partnership that leased and operated a
commercial property, was held to have breached his duty to Mein-
hard, a passive partner who provided the financing, by negotiating a
lease renewal on his own behalf without notifying Meinhard and af-
fording him the opportunity to compete with Salmon for the new
lease.l°6 Leaving open the question of whether Salmon could seek the
lease renewal for himself, the court held he must nevertheless disclose
to Meinhard his intention not to seek its renewal on the partnership's
behalf. 07
Contractarians argue that broad and open-ended judicial assertions
of fiduciary responsibility are an open invitation for disappointed
partners to attempt to persuade sympathetic judges to apply personal
notions of fairness as a basis for renegotiating partnership deals.1°8
Instead, contractarians argue for a statutory restraint of judicial dis-
cretion, with an eye to discouraging litigation that would undo the
parties' deal. Moreover, contractarians contend that whatever fiduci-
ary duties are adopted should be only default rules, which the parties
may waive in their entirety.
More traditional commentators, on the other hand, urge a more
complete statement of fiduciary principles and statutory recognition
of the judicial role of providing ex post review of allegedly opportu-
nistic or unfair conduct.101 For them, partnership is fundamentally re-
lational and fiduciary in character, not merely contractual. Therefore,
partners' fiduciary duties are immutable and cannot be reduced by the
parties below a fundamental core, much less be waived in their en-
tirety.
106. Id. at 547.
107. Id.
108. J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 29 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 52-61 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term
Assessment of the Project To Revive the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 111, 137-41
(1990) [hereinafter A Mid-Term Assessment).
109. Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. Rav. 523 (1993); Claire M. Dickerson, Is It Appropriate To Appropriate
Corporate Concepts. Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. CoLO. L.
Rav. 111 (1993).
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Not surprisingly, RUPA and the Revised Florida Act are something
of a compromise." 0 First, FRUPA section 404(1)"' acknowledges the
fiduciary nature of the partnership relationship by characterizing a
partner's duties as "fiduciary." That section then limits the extent of
those duties by providing that "the only fiduciary duties a partner
owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care as set forth in subsections (2) and (3)." 112 The
intent of that provision is to reign in, by statutory edict, the propen-
sity of some judges to tailor new fiduciary duties from whole cloth." 3
This point obviously reflects a contractarian impulse.
a. Duty of Loyalty
First and most fundamentally, the Revised Florida Act makes clear
that a partner is not a trustee and is not held to the same standards as
a trustee. Section 404(5) provides that a partner does not violate his
fiduciary duty "merely because the partner's conduct furthers the
partner's own interest. ' " 4 Thus, a partner's rights as an owner and
principal in the enterprise may be balanced against his duties as an
agent and fiduciary in applying the duty of loyalty.' 15
110. Donald J. Weidner, the Reporter for the Revised Uniform Act, argues that RUPA
"represents a major and sufficient move toward a contractarian statement of the law" and re-
jects the assertion "that partners should be free to contract away all their fiduciary duties." See
Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationships, 58 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995). He states:
First, individuals rarely "bargain" as equals for partnership agreements that com-
pletely define their relationship. The law should assume that the completely defined
partnership relationship is the exception rather than the norm. It should also take into
account the probability that the bargaining process involves human foible and impor-
tant information asymmetries, if not outright fraud. Second, even apart from the im-
perfections of bargaining, prohibiting certain types of relationships is preferable to
permitting them. Mandatory minima are designed to prevent types of relationships
that would cost more than they would benefit. Finally, the language of fiduciary law,
with its mandatory rules, is preferable to the language of the law of the sale of goods,
with its mandatory rules. The language stating the minima among partners ought to
reflect the texture of their relationship, which is one of a powerful mutual agency, ill-
defined hierarchy, and joint and several liability. If the indeterminacy of the minima is
kept in check, the benefit of the minima will far exceed the cost.
Id. at 82.
111. See FRUPA § 404(1). Section 404 is entitled "General Standards of Partner's Con-
duct." The title comes from § 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA).
See also FLA. STAT. § 607.0830 (1995) (General Standards for Directors).
112. FRUPA § 404(l).
113. See Vestal, supra note 109, at 537-45; Reporters' Overview, supra note 38, at 33. In
light of the, common law tradition which spawned the concept of fiduciary duty, the ultimate
success of the Act's efforts to limit that duty would seem problematic.
114. FRUPA § 404(5).
115. See RUPA § 404, cmt. 5. That principle may also be relevant in applying the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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Section 404(2) of the Revised Florida Act sets forth three specific
rules that constitute a partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and
the other partners:
(a) A partner must account for any property, profit, or benefit
derived by the partner from the partnership business or the use of
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity;" 6
(b) A partner must not deal with the partnership as or on behalf of
an adverse party;" 7 and
(c) A partner must not compete with the partnership." s
Despite the broad language often used by judges in the formulation of
the duty of loyalty under prior law, the result will almost invariably be
the same under one of FRUPA's three rules. Thus, any substantive
change wrought by the Revised Florida Act is more apparent than
real. On the other hand, FRUPA's enhanced specificity in the articu-
lation of the rules will sharpen the legal analysis.
The Revised Uniform Act provides expressly that the three loyalty
rules are exclusive.1"9 That provision was intended to prevent further
judicial expansion of the duty of loyalty. The Revised Florida Act ex-
pressly provides to the contrary, stating that "a partner's duty of loy-
alty . - . includes, without limitation," the three enumerated duties. 2
The Florida drafters were concerned that the RUPA text too severely
narrowed the duty of loyalty as fashioned by the courts over the years
and therefore expressed a preference toward continued judicial devel-
opment. 12'
The partnership agreement may not eliminate the duty of loyalty,
but may "identify specific types or categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable.' '1 2  Thus,
FRUPA affords the parties substantial leeway in drawing their own
lines regarding the duty of loyalty, but ensures an irreducible core of
116. That rule is based on UPA 4 21(1).
117. That rule is derived from §§ 389 and 391 of the REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
(1957). See RUPA § 404, cmt. 2.
118. That rule is derived from § 393 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957). The
duty not to compete terminates upon the dissolution of the partnership or, under FRUPA
§ 603(2)(b), upon a partner's dissociation.
119. See RUPA § 404(b) ("A partner's duty of loyalty ... is limited to the following
.") (emphasis added).
120. FRUPA § 404(2).
121. See id. § 404, Fla. cmt. FLORIDA BAR CLE ON PARTNERSHIP LAw, supra note 65, at 66.
122. Id. § 103(2)(a)3.
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fiduciary responsibility. 2 3 The specificity requirement prevents broad
waivers and forces the partners to think about their consent to a co-
partner's self-interest in terms of the types and categories of activities
that are condoned. That specific recognition should also make it
easier for courts to ascertain the intention of the parties in the event
of litigation.'A The "unless manifestly unreasonable" trump card
gives courts a handle for refusing to enforce an unconscionable excul-
patory clause. The mere possibility of judicial invalidation, by itself,
should discourage overreaching by a partner with superior bargaining
power or sophistication.
The Revised Florida Act also clarifies the right of partners under
general law to consent to another partner's known prior or anticipated
violation of a legal duty and to waive the right to redress for the viola-
tion. 125 After full disclosure of all material facts, a partner's specific
self-interested act or transaction, not otherwise permitted by the Act
or the partnership agreement, may be authorized or ratified by the
other partners. '6 Consent must be unanimous, unless otherwise spe-
cifically provided in the partnership agreement. 27
b. Duty of Care
The UPA is silent regarding a partner's duty of care, and there is a
dearth of judicial authority as to the existence of such a duty.12 The
Revised Florida Act explicitly provides that a partner owes a duty of
care to the partnership'2 9 and the other partners. This duty "is limited
to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct,
123. That is a compromise between the traditional view that the fiduciary duty of loyalty
cannot be waived ex ante and the contractarian view that the duty may be waived entirely. Both
camps have been critical of the RUPA compromise. See supra notes 108-09 (citing authorities
critical of the compromise).
124. See, e.g., Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). In Singer, the court
upheld a broadly worded exculpatory clause that probably would not be enforced under RUPA
as drafted. If, however, the agreement were drafted to provide that the partners are free to
compete with the partnership "with respect to the acquisition of mineral interests in the Britton
area," it quite possibly would meet RUPA's specificity requirements. Given the Singers' sophis-
tication and past practice, such an exculpatory provision might also pass muster under RUPA's
"not manifestly unreasonable" standard. See Weidner, supra note 110, at 92-93.
125. See RUPA § 103, cmt. 5.
126. FRUPA § 103(2)(a)3.
127. Id.
128. See RUPA § 404, cmt. 3. A few courts have recognized a duty of care. See, e.g., Rosen-
thal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988) (recognizing the duty of care not to act in
grossly negligent manner).
129. FRUPA § 404(1).
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intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law." 30 That stan-
dard of care reflects the policy that partners accept, as a cost of doing
business, the risks of each other's ordinary negligence and should,
therefore, share equally in the financial consequences.' 3 ' The duty of
care is immutable and cannot be waived in its entirety, but the
standard of care may be reduced in the partnership agreement, if the
reduction is not unreasonable.132
2. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In addition to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, which are
rooted in the relational nature of partnership, the Revised Florida Act
expressly recognizes an "obligation" of good faith and fair dealing,
an obligation which reflects a partnership's contractual nature.'33 Sec-
tion 404(4) provides that "[a] partner shall discharge the duties to the
partnership and the other partners under this [A]ct or under the part-
nership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing." That is not an independent
obligation, but is ancillary to a partner's discharge of every duty and
exercise of every right, contractual or statutory.
"Good faith and fair dealing" has no well-established meaning.
While "good faith" suggests a subjective element, "fair dealing" con-
notes an objective component. The concept is not defined in the Act,
and its precise meaning is left to judicial development. 1 4 The
130. Id. § 404(3). A partner's duty of care extends to the conduct and winding up of the
partnership business. Id. Upon a partner's dissociation, the duty continues "only with regard to
matters arising and events occurring before the partner's dissociation, unless the partner partici-
pates in winding up the partnership's business." Id. § 603(2)(c).
131. See Reporters' Overview, supra note 38, at 22.
132. FRUPA § 103(2Xb). An agreement releasing a partner from liability for any action
taken in good faith and in the honest belief that the action is in the best interests of the partner-
ship would seem reasonable; an agreement absolving a partner of intentional misconduct is
probably not. See RUPA § 103, cmt. 6. The partners may always agree to a heightened standard
of care. Id.
133. See id. § 404, cmt. 4. The duty is recognized as an implied obligation of every contract
by § 205 of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRACTS (1981). See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988) (construing an employment agreement); Gelder Medi-
cal Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977) (construing a partnership agreement).
Many courts, however, articulate good faith and fair dealing as a component of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 (Mass. 1989); Covalt
v. High, 675 P.2d 999, 1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Wyler v. Feuer, 149 Cal. Rptr. 626, 632
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
134. See RUPA § 404, cmt. 4. The UCC defines "good faith" as honesty in fact and, in the
case of a merchant, the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade. See UCC §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(b). Some view good faith as an "excluder" with no intrinsic
meaning of its own, better understood by what it rules out as bad faith. See Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provision of the Uniform Commercial
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obligation is immutable and cannot be eliminated in the partnership
agreement, but the agreement may prescribe "standards by which the
performance of the obligation is to be measured if the standards are
not manifestly unreasonable." 3 '
The Revised Florida Act makes it clear that a partner may lend
money to and transact other business with the partnership, as to
which the partner has the same rights and obligations as a non-
partner. 1
3 6
3. Partner's Information Rights and Duties
Although not characterized as a fiduciary duty, the Revised Florida
Act continues the UPA rule that all partners have full access to the
partnership's books and records. This right extends to former partners
with respect to books and records pertaining to the time they were
partners.' 37 Moreover, under FRUPA, a partner's right of access to
the books and records is virtually absolute'3 8 and may not be unrea-
sonably restricted in the partnership agreement.3 9
The Revised Florida Act also continues a partner's right to obtain,
on demand, any information concerning the partnership's business
and affairs."40 Under FRUPA, however, each partner and the partner-
ship must also furnish to every partner, "[w]ithout demand, any in-
formation concerning the partnership's business and affairs
reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and
duties under the partnership agreement or this [A]ct.""4 That require-
ment is new and imposes on the partnership and partners individually
Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 262 (1968). For a novel analysis of fiduciary duty and good faith as
the opposite ends of the same continuum, see Claire M. Dickerson, From Behind the Looking
Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 955 (1995).
135. FRUPA § 103(2)(c). The language is drawn from UCC § 1-102(3). See RUPA § 103,
cmt. 7.
136. FRUPA § 404(6). That is based on RULPA § 107. The partner's rights are subject to
"other applicable law," such as equitable subordination and insider preference rules, which are
not intended to be displaced. See RUPA § 404, cmt. 6.
137. FRUPA § 403(2). Compare UPA § 19. The right of access includes the right to inspect
and, at the partner's expense, to copy books and records during ordinary business hours.
FRUPA § 403(2).
138. See RUPA § 403, cmt. 2. Under FRUPA, a partner's right of access to the books and
records is not conditioned on a proper purpose. Compare RMBCA § 16.02(c)(1) (shareholder
must have proper purpose to inspect certain corporate records).
139. FRUPA § 103(2)(a)2.
140. Id. § 403(3)(b). Compare UPA § 20. The right to such information extends to the legal
representative of a deceased partner or a partner under legal disability. FRUPA § 403(3). The
partnership may refuse to provide information if either the demand or the information requested
is unreasonable or otherwise improper. id. § 403(3)(b).
141. Id. § 403(3)(a) (emphasis added).
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an affirmative disclosure obligation. 142 The precise scope and meaning
of the duty is left to judicial development. Under FRUPA, neither of
these information rights may be unreasonably restricted in the part-
-nership agreement. 14
3
G. New Breakup Rules
The most dramatic changes effected by the Revised Florida Act
concern the rules governing a partner's departure. Under the UPA,
the departure of a single partner results inescapably in the "dissolu-
tion" of the partnership. Even if the business is continued by the re-
maining partners, a technical dissolution cannot be avoided.'
44
Dissolution is the natural consequence of an aggregate theory of part-
nership. Moreover, absent agreement to the contrary, upon dissolu-
tion any partner has the right to have the business liquidated, its debts
paid, and the surplus, if any, distributed in cash. 45 The result is a
fragile form of business organization whose instability cannot be com-
pletely overcome by agreement.
The Revised Florida Act greatly simplifies the rules governing part-
nership breakup and enhances the stability of the enterprise. By em-
bracing the entity theory of partnership, FRUPA invites a change in
the fundamental notion that any partner's departure necessarily
causes a dissolution of the partnership. To the contrary, under
FRUPA, not every departure, or "dissociation," causes a "dissolu-
tion" and winding up, that is, a liquidation of the partnership busi-
ness and the termination of the partnership entity.
The entity theory provides the conceptual framework for a continu-
ation of the partnership business by the remaining partners. A
partner's departure need have no effect on the continued existence of
142. Absent a demand, there is no express disclosure duty under the UPA. Under some cir-
cumstances, however, an affirmative disclosure duty has been inferred, either from other sec-
tions of the Act or the common law duty of good faith. See RUPA § 403, cmt. 3. The existence
and scope of those duties were not well-developed under prior law. The Revised Florida Act
§ 403(3)(a) is not intended to be exclusive, and other affirmative disclosure duties may still be
inferred from other provisions of FRUPA. See id.
143. FRUPA § 103(2)(a)2. Under RUPA § 103(b)(2), a partner's right of access to the part-
nership books and records is immutable, but a partner's other information rights are not, and
thus the latter may be abolished by agreement.
144. Uniform Partnership Act § 29 defines "dissolution" as the change in the relationship
caused by any partner's ceasing to be "associated" in the carrying on (as distinguished from the
winding up) of the business. Under the UPA, the partnership is merely the aggregation of interests
resulting from the "association" of the individual partners. See UPA § 6; supra notes 19-25 and
accompanying text (discussing aggregate theory). With the departure of any partner, that association
disappears, even if it is instantly replaced by another association with a similar cast of characters,
save the departed partner. See UPA § 41 and general discussion; RUPA § 601, cmt. 1.
145. See UPA § 38(1).
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the partnership entity. If the partnership is continued, the dissociated
partner's economic interest will be bought out in a manner similar to
the buyout of a departing shareholder's shares. If the partnership en-
tity is not to continue, its business and affairs will be wound up.
That does not mean that a partner may be compelled to remain a
partner. As under the UPA,' 46 every partner has the power to dissoci-
ate at any time by express will, even in violation of the partnership
agreement. 47 The Revised Florida Act continues the traditional policy
that the mutual agency authority of partners, together with their per-
sonal liability for all partnership obligations, is so extraordinary that a
person's status as a partner should always be terminable at will.
1. Dissociation
With one exception,'14 partners under FRUPA have complete free-
dom to decide what constitutes an event of dissociation. The partner-
ship agreement may not abrogate the power of a court to expel a
partner: 1) for misconduct that adversely affects the business; 2) for
willful or persistent breach of fiduciary duty or of the partnership
agreement; or 3) for conduct which makes it impracticable to carry on
the business with that partner.149 The Revised Florida Act sets forth
the events that cause dissociation in the absence of a partnership
agreement to the contrary. 50 Included are most of the traditional
causes of "dissolution" under the UPA,"' such as a partner's
death," 2 incompetence, "5' bankruptcy, 14 or expulsion."'
146. Id. § 31(2).
147. The Revised Florida Act § 602(1) expressly provides that a partner has the power to
dissociate at any time, whether rightfully or wrongfully, by express will pursuant to FRUPA
§ 601(1). That rule is made immutable by FRUPA § 103(2)(d). See infra note 161 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the consequence of wrongful dissociation).
148. FRUPA § 103(2)(e). As previously discussed, an agreement that purports to prevent a
partner from dissociating at will is not specifically enforceable, but the breach of such an agree-
ment may open the wrongfully dissociating partner to liability for consequential damages. See
infra note 161 (discussing FRUPA § 602(3)).




152. FRUPA § 601(7)(a). There are analogous events of dissociation for various types of
entity partners. See id. § 601(8) (trust), (9) (estate), (10) (other entity).
153. Id. § 601(7)(b) (appointment of guardian or general conservator), (c) (judicial determi-
nation that a partner is incapable of performing duties).
154. Id. § 601(6)(a). Other indicia of financial distress are also included. Id. § 601(6)(b) (as-
signment for benefit of creditors), (c) (appointment of trustee, receiver, or liquidator), (d)
(failure to vacate involuntary appointment).
Under the Revised Uniform Act, "debtor in bankruptcy" is defined as a person subject to an
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2. Wrongful Dissociation
The Revised Florida Act continues the UPA concept of wrongful
dissociation, '5 6 but simplifies and clarifies the applicable rules. Under
FRUPA, a partner's dissociation is "wrongful" only if it is in breach
of an express provision of the partnership agreement'5 7 or, in a term
partnership, if the partner prematurely withdraws by express will in
violation of the partnership agreement before the expiration of the
term or the completion of the undertaking,'58 is expelled, 5 9 or is disso-
ciated by becoming a debtor in bankruptcy. 6 A partner who wrong-
fully dissociates is liable to the partnership and to the other partners
for damages caused by the dissociation. '6  The grounds for wrongful
dissociation may be varied in the partnership agreement, as may the
consequences, or the concept may be abolished entirely.
order for relief under any chapter of the federal Bankruptcy Code (Title I of the United States
Code), or a comparable order under federal, state, or foreign law governing insolvency. RUPA
§ 101(2) (emphasis added). Surprisingly, in light of the prevalence of foreign partners in Florida
partnerships, FRUPA deletes the reference to foreign insolvency law. See FRUPA § 101(3)(b).
Thus, in Florida, the partnership agreement must provide for a partner's dissociation by reason
of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, if that is the desired outcome.
155. In addition to judicial expulsion under FRUPA § 601(5) and expulsion pursuant to the
partnership agreement under FRUPA § 601(3), the Act now affords a default right of expulsion
by the unanimous vote of the partners if:
(i) it is unlawful to carry on the business with the partner;
(ii) the partner has made a voluntary assignment (other than a security interest) of
substantially all of his partnership interest; or
(iii) an entity partner has been dissolved or its right to conduct business suspended for
more than 90 days without cure.
FRUPA § 601(4).
156. See UPA § 38(2), which provides special rules for a partner "who has caused the disso-
lution wrongfully." The term is not clearly defined, but includes a partner who has caused disso-
lution "in contravention of the partnership agreement." Under FRUPA, a partner's dissociation
may be wrongful, but it does not result in a dissolution of the partnership. See FRUPA
§ 801(2)(a), discussed infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
157. FRUPA § 602(2)(a).
158. Id. § 602(2)(b)1. There is an exception if the partner withdraws within 90 days after the
dissociation of another partner. Id. Thus, such a "reactive" dissociation is rightful. See infra
notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
159. FRUPA § 602(2)(b)2. The dissociation is wrongful only if the partner is expelled by a
court under FRUPA § 601(5). Thus, expulsion by the other partners under FRUPA § 601(3) or
(4) is not a wrongful dissociation. The expulsion or willful dissolution of a partner that is a
business entity is a wrongful dissociation, however. Id. § 602(2)(b)4.
160. Id. § 602(2)(b)3. That rule recognizes that a person may file bankruptcy today with little
financial or reputational loss, thereby creating a loophole by which a partner could file bank-
ruptcy in lieu of withdrawing from a term partnership.
161. Id. § 602(3).
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3. Dissolution and Winding Up
Under FRUPA, whether the partnership entity is to be continued or
dissolved upon a partner's dissociation is left almost completely to the
agreement of the partners. The only significant constraint on the
continuation of a partnership by agreement is a partner's immutable
right to seek a judicial dissolution and winding up of the partner-
ship 162
The partnership agreement may specify what events will cause a
winding up of the business.' 63 To the extent that the partnership agree-
ment does not provide otherwise, the Act sets forth the default events
of dissolution.'6 For a term partnership, 6 those events include the
162. See id. § 103(2)(f). The reference in that section to FRUPA § 601 is erroneous; the
reference should be to FRUPA § 801. Compare RUPA § 103(b)(8). The error will be corrected
in the "glitch bill."
The FRUPA § 801(5) grounds for judicial dissolution are:
(i) the partnership's economic purpose is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(ii) another partner has acted so as to make it impracticable to carry on the business
with that partner; or
(iii) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity
with the partnership agreement.
The Uniform Partnership Act § 32(1) provides for judicial dissolution. The new language is
drawn from RULPA § 802. See RUPA § 801, cmt. 8.
The Revised Florida Act § 801(6) provides for judicial dissolution on application of a trans-
feree of a partner's interest in the partnership. That right is also immutable. FRUPA § 103(2)(f).
The only other immutable cause of dissolution is an event making it unlawful to continue the
partnership business. See id. §§ 103(2)(f), 801(4).
163. Id. § 801(3).
164. See id. § 801. The Revised Florida Act retains the word "dissolution," as does RUPA,
but its meaning is not the same as under the UPA. Under UPA § 29, dissolution refers to the
change in the relation of the partners caused by the departure of any partner, which is a funda-
mental change under the aggregate theory of partnership. Under the entity theory, the partner-
ship entity continues until the business has been wound up. "Dissolution," as it is used in
FRUPA, is merely a shorthand way of noting that the winding up process has begun. Thus, it is
redundant to say, as does FRUPA § 801, that a partnership "is dissolved and its business must
be wound up."
Early drafts of RUPA did not use the term "dissolution," and the Revised Texas Act, which
is based on an earlier draft of RUPA, does not use the term "dissolution." See Texas Revised
Partnership Act, TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-8.01 (West 1995). For a more complete
discussion of the new meaning of "dissolution," see Reporters' Overview, supra note 38, at 8.
165. The Revised Florida Act does not define "term partnership." As used in FRUPA, it
means a partnership that is not a "partnership at will." "Partnership at will" is defined as a
partnership "in which the partners have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a
definite term or the completion of a particular undertaking." FRUPA § 101(7). Thus, a term
partnership is one in which the partners have agreed to remain partners for a definite term or a
particular undertaking.
The distinction is critical, since the grounds for dissolution under FRUPA § 801 differ
depending on whether the partnership is a term partnership or an at-will partnership. The
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expiration of the term or the completion of its undertaking,' 6 as well
as the express will of all the partners. 67
FRUPA also provides for the so-called "reactive" dissolution and
winding up of a term partnership following a partner's dissociation by
death, incompetence, bankruptcy, or other specified cause or wrong-
ful dissociation in breach of the partnership agreement.'" In those
events, the partnership is dissolved and its business must be wound up
unless, within ninety days, a majority in interest of the remaining
partners agree to continue the partnership.16 9
The Revised Uniform Act continues the UPA rule that a partner-
ship at will is dissolved and must be wound up upon the express will
of any partner to withdraw.17 0 That was one of the most controversial
issues in the drafting of the new Act, and many thought that the deci-
sion to wind up the business should be left to a majority of the re-
maining partners. 7 1  Considerable difference of opinion (but no
distinction is also crucial in determining whether a partner's dissociation is wrongful under
FRUPA § 602(2)(b). Where the partnership agreement is not clear, the result depends upon the
intention of the partners, which is a question of fact. In close cases, courts often infer a term or
undertaking from the partnership's purpose. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Orlando, 427 So. 2d
1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (purpose to complete a single construction contract); see also RUPA
§ 101, cmt. (citing cases).
166. FRUPA § 801(2)(c).
167. Id. § 801(2)(b). That follows the general rule that any transaction outside the ordinary
course of business or an amendment to the partnership agreement requires unanimous consent.
Id. § 401(10).
168. See id. § 801(2)(a).
169. Id. Allowing a majority of the partners to continue the business is a change in the law.
Under the UPA, unanimous consent is required to continue the business of a term partnership
following the premature departure of one partner, thus giving each of the remaining partners a
right to dissolution. See UPA § 38(2)(b). This broad dissolution power was viewed as inappro-
priate in light of the partners' original agreement to continue the partnership for a definite term
or particular undertaking. In effect, FRUPA allows the remaining partners to decide collectively
whether the first partner's premature departure jeopardizes the successful continuation of the
business. If the business is continued by the majority, any dissenting partner who wishes to
withdraw may rightfully do so under the exception to FRUPA § 602(2)(b)l. See RUPA § 801,
cmt. 5. The interest and vote of a partner who dissociates rightfully under FRUPA § 602(2)(b)l
is counted in determining whether a majority in interest agrees to continue.
Majority in interest is not the normal FRUPA default rule for partnership business. See
FRUPA § 401(10) (majority of the partners). Requiring a majority in interest satisfies Internal
Revenue Service concerns regarding a partnership's continuity of life. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(b)(1). "Majority in interest" is not defined in FRUPA, but is intended to satisfy
Rev. Proc. 94-45 (June 29, 1994). The "in-interest" concept refers to partners' economic inter-
ests in both profits and capital of the partnership. See RUPA § 801, cmt. 5. Those concerns may
soon be eliminated, if the IRS's recent "check-the-box" proposal is adopted. See supra note 25.
170. RUPA § 801(1). The dissolution occurs when the partnership has notice of the partner's
will to withdraw, unless a later date is specified by the partner. A partner at will who has already
been dissociated by expulsion, bankruptcy, incompetency, or otherwise under RUPA § 601(2)
through (10) is not entitled to have the partnership wound up. Id. § 801(1).
171. See, e.g., A Mid-Term Assessment, supra note 108, at 148-50.
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empirical evidence) existed as to the relative likelihood of
opportunistic abuse by the majority or the minority. Ultimately, the
drafters decided to retain the traditional rule giving every partner in
an at-will partnership the right to have the business wound up. It is
only a default rule, and the partnership agreement may provide that a
departing partner is not entitled to have the business wound up but
must be bought out by the remaining partners. The Revised Florida
Act provides likewise.
7 2
"Dissolution" is merely the beginning of the winding up process.173
The partnership entity continues after dissolution, although the scope
of its business is limited to the purpose of winding up its affairs.
7 4
But winding up is not an irreversible process. At any time before the
winding up is completed, the partners may agree not to wind up and
terminate the partnership, but rather to resume carrying on the part-
nership's business. 17 After dissolution, the consent of all the partners,
including any rightfully dissociating partner, is required to resume the
business, since, in effect, the partners are waiving their right to have
the assets sold and the liabilities satisfied. 176 If all the partners con-
sent, the partnership resumes carrying on its business as if dissolution
had never occurred, and any liability incurred by the partnership after
the winding up began is determined as if there had been no dissolu-
tion. 77 The rights of third parties who act in reliance on the dissolu-
tion, without knowledge (or a notification) of the waiver, are
protected.T78
4. Buyout of Dissociated Partner's Interest
If a partner's dissociation does not result in a dissolution and liqui-
dation of the partnership business, the dissociated partner's interest in
the partnership must be purchased by the partnership or the remaining
172. FRUPA § 801(1).
173. See supra note 164.
174. See FRUPA § 802(1). The curtailment of the partnership's purpose after dissolution
results in a similar curtailment of the partners' actual authority. See id. § 804(1).
After dissolution, the partnership's business may be preserved as a going concern for a reason-
able time in order to preserve its going concern value. See id. § 803(3). When the winding up of
its business is completed, the partnership is terminated. Id. § 802(1).
175. Id. § 802(2)(a).
176. Id. § 802(2). A dissociating partner's waiver of the right to dissolution means that the
dissociating partner's interest will be bought out. The need for her consent to resume the busi-
ness should give the departing partner the necessary leverage to negotiate a fair buyout price.
Under § 802(2), the consent of a wrongfully dissociating partner is not required, because such a
partner never had a right to have the business liquidated.
177. Id. § 802(2)(a).
178. Id. § 802(2)(b).
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partners." 9 If the partnership agreement does not provide otherwise,
and the parties cannot agree ex post on the amount the dissociating
partner is to receive or on the other terms and conditions of the buy-
out, the FRUPA default rules apply.
Under the default rules, the buyout price is the amount that would
have been distributable to the dissociating partner if, on the date of
dissociation, the partnership's assets and business had been sold, its
liabilities satisfied, and the surplus distributed.8 0 Thus, the buyout
price is determined by a hypothetical liquidation as of the date of dis-
sociation. The Act specifically provides that the hypothetical sale price
of the business is the greater of the going concern value of the entire
business without the dissociating partner or the liquidation value of its
assets. 8 ' In winding up the partnership's business, all of its liabilities
must be paid before any surplus is distributed to the partners;'82 thus,
the buyout price is the net of all known liabilities.'83 Damages for
wrongful dissociation' 4 and all other amounts owing from the
179. Id. § 701(1). That section literally provides that the partnership must "cause" the disso-
ciated partner's interest to be purchased. That is intended to accommodate a purchase by one or
more of the remaining partners or a new investor. See id. § 701, cmt. 2. The buyout price and
terms of the buyout may be varied by the partnership agreement. Although § 701 is not made
immutable by FRUPA § 103(2), a partnership agreement that provides for a total forfeiture of a
partner's interest upon dissociation would probably not be enforced under general law. See
Jones v. Chester, 363 S.W.2d 150, 157 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962) (forfeiture of partner's entire inter-
est upon dissolution is unconscionable and unenforceable). In that sense, a buyout is mandatory.
180. FRUPA § 701(2).
181. Id. "Buyout price" is a new term. The drafters intended that its meaning be developed
as an independent concept appropriate to the context of a partnership buyout. Traditional terms,
such as "fair value" or "fair market value," were not used because they have become terms of
art in some contexts. See RUPA § 701, cmt. 3.
Liquidation value is not intended to mean distress sale value. Under either the going concern
or liquidation value standard, the hypothetical selling price should be the price that a willing and
informed buyer would pay a willing and informed seller, with neither being under any compul-
sion to deal. Going concern value is intended to negate any notion of a minority discount. Other
discounts, such as for a lack of marketability, may be appropriate. Id.
182. See FRUPA § 807(1).
183. The Revised Florida Act does not expressly address whether only known liabilities are
taken into account in determining the buyout price or whether unknown liabilities may also be
considered. When a partnership's business is actually wound up under Article 8, every partner
remains jointly and severally liable for all partnership debts and must contribute the amount
necessary to satisfy any partnership obligations that were unknown at the time the business was
wound up and the partners' "final" accounts were settled. See FRUPA § 807(4). This contingent
liability continues until the statute of limitations has run on all partnership obligations. Thus, in
determining the buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest in the partnership, it would seem
appropriate to take known contingent liabilities into account in the hypothetical liquidation, and
arguably the value of the partner's interest should be discounted for unknown liabilities. It is
clear, however, that § 701(2) provides an incentive for the partnership to disclose all known
liabilities, however remote or contingent, and an incentive for the dissociating partner to with-
hold information about possible obligations known only to her.
184. See FRUPA § 602(3), discussed supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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dissociated partner to the partnership, whether or not then due, are
offset against the buyout price.' 85 Interest on the buyout price must be
paid from the date of dissociation to the date of payment.'86 If the
parties cannot agree on the value of the partnership's business, and
thus the buyout price of the partner's interest in the partnership,
FRUPA provides rather detailed procedures for obtaining a judicial
determination of the buyout price and the payment terms. t87
Briefly, the statutory default procedure requires the dissociated
partner to make a written demand for payment. 8 ' If the parties can-
not agree on the buyout price within 120 days thereafter, the partner-
ship must tender payment in cash of the amount it estimates to be the
price, subject to any offsets provided by the Act. 8 9 The partnership
must also provide the dissociated partner with a list showing the
firm's assets and liabilities as of the date of dissociation, as well as the
most recent balance sheet and income statement (if any), an explana-
tion of how the estimated buyout price was calculated, and written
notice that the dissociated partner has 120 days to commence an ac-
tion to determine the buyout price or be bound by the amount of the
tendered payment.' 90 If suit is brought, the court will determine the
buyout price of the dissociated partner's interest, any offsets due un-
der the Act, and accrued interest. 9' The court may also assess attor-
ney's fees and expenses, such as appraiser's fees, if the court finds
that either party acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith;
185. FRUPA § 701(3). Therefore, the offset might include damages for the dissociating part-
ner's breach of the partnership agreement or of her fiduciary duties or for partnership debts
incurred by the partner without actual authority. Under FRUPA, the partnership itself has
standing to maintain an action for such relief. See id. § 405(l).
Other amounts then due from the partnership to the dissociating partner may be offset under
general law against the buyout price. There is no provision for the acceleration of amounts due
to the dissociating partner, however. Thus, repayment of a term loan that is not yet due made to
the partner by the partnership is accelerated and offset, but such a loan made by the partner to
the partnership is not; the latter need not be repaid until actually due. The partnership agreement
or the loan agreement may, of course, provide for the acceleration and setoff of a partner's loan
to the partnership.
186. FRUPA § 701(2). The Revised Florida Act § 104(2) provides that the default interest
rate is that specified in § 687.01, Florida Statutes, which, in the absence of a contract, is the
statutory rate of interest. Section 687.01 sets that rate as the rate provided for in § 55.03. The
rate is currently 10% per annum.
187. See FRUPA § 701(5)-(9); RUPA § 701, cmts. 6-10. For a more complete discussion of
the buyout procedure, see Reporters' Overview, supra note 38. at 10-13.
188. FRUPA § 701(5). The dissociated partner's written demand triggers the other buyout
rules.
189. id.
190. Id. § 701(7).
191. Id. § 701(9). The action must be brought within 120 days after the partnership has ten-
dered payment of the amount it believes is due or, if no payment is tendered, within one year
after the dissociated partner's written demand for payment. Id.
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such conduct would include the partnership's failure to tender pay-
ment or otherwise comply with the Act's requirements. 192
In addition to the buyout price for a dissociated partner's interest in
the partnership, FRUPA provides that the partnership must indem-
nify the dissociated partner against all partnership liabilities.' 93 The
indemnification covers all liabilities, whether incurred before or after
the partner's dissociation, except liabilities incurred by the partner af-
ter his dissociation and without actual authority but which are binding
on the partnership because of the partner's lingering apparent author-
ity.'9 Indemnifying a dissociated partner is appropriate because the
buyout price of the dissociated partner's interest is based on the net
value of the partnership's assets and business, less liabilities, and as
between the partners he should not have to pay again if sued by a
creditor.
5. Dissociated Partner's Lingering Agency Authority and Personal
Liability
The Revised Florida Act provides comprehensive rules for winding
down a partner's lingering apparent authority and personal liability
upon dissociation. The Act also authorizes the filing of a statement of
dissociation that is deemed to be constructive notice of a partner's
dissociation and significantly limits his lingering authority and
liability.
a. Apparent Authority
Under FRUPA, a dissociated partner has apparent authority for up
to one year after dissociation to bind the partnership by an act which
apparently carries on the partnership's business in the ordinary
192. Id.
193. Id. § 701(4). A partner's dissociation does not of itself discharge the partner's liability
for all partnership obligations incurred while she was a partner. Id. § 703(1). A dissociated part-
ner may also be held personally liable to partnership creditors for debts incurred by the partner-
ship for up to one year after the partner's dissociation. Id. § 703(2). The indemnification
required by § 701(4) covers a dissociated partner's lingering liability for both old and new debts.
In principle, the indemnification required by § 701(4) is overinclusive because it protects the
dissociated partner from unknown future liabilities that could not have been taken into account
in determining the value of her interest but for which she would have been liable for contribution
if the partnership were liquidated.
194. Id. § 701(4). A dissociated partner's apparent authority to bind the partnership may
linger for up to one year after dissociation. See id. § 702(1), discussed infra notes 195-98 and
accompanying text.
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course. 19 Under the Revised Uniform Act, however, a dissociated
partner's apparent authority may continue for as long as two years. 96
The partnership is bound only if at the time of the transaction the
other party reasonably believed that the dissociated partner was then a
partner and the other party had no notice of the partner's dissocia-
tion. 9 7 Thus, there must have been reasonable reliance on the part-
ner's continued status as a partner. As a practical matter, the other
party must previously have transacted business with the dissociated
partner. The partnership can attempt to cut off the dissociated part-
ner's apparent authority by immediately sending a notification of his
dissociation to all known parties who had previously dealt with him.
The dissociated partner is liable to the partnership for any damage
arising from an obligation incurred by the partner after his dissocia-
tion.19
b. Personal Liability
A partner's dissociation does not of itself discharge his liability for
partnership obligations incurred before dissociation. 99 Under
FRUPA, a dissociated partner is not, however, liable for partnership
obligations incurred after his dissociation, except those incurred
within one year of the partner's dissociation if the other party had no
notice of the dissociation and reasonably believed the dissociated part-
ner was still a partner.20 Under the Revised Uniform Act, a dissoci-
ated partner's exposure for new obligations is two years, 20' similar to
the duration of his lingering apparent authority. A dissociated partner
can, however, limit his lingering liability for new partnership
195. FRUPA § 702(1) (providing that the partnership is bound by a dissociated partner's act
which would have bound it under FRUPA § 301 before the partner's dissociation). For a discus-
sion of § 301, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
196. RUPA § 702(a).
197. FRUPA § 702(1). The statute is somewhat redundant because a party with notice of the
partner's dissociation obviously cannot reasonably believe the dissociated partner is still a part-
ner. "Notice" is defined in FRUPA § 102(2). For clarity, FRUPA § 702(l)(c) further provides
that the dissociated partner's apparent authority is cut off if the other party to the transaction is
"deemed" to have had either knowledge under § 303(4) by reason of a recorded statement of
dissociation or notice under § 704(4) by reason of a filed statement. The effect of a statement of
dissociation is discussed infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text. The reference in FRUPA
§ 702(l)(c) to § 303(5) is in error. The reference should be to § 303(4). Compare RUPA
§ 702(a)(3). This error will be corrected in the "glitch bill."
198. FRUPA § 702(2).
199. Id. § 703(1).
200. See id. § 703(2). Section 703(2)(c), like § 702(l)(c), contains an incorrect reference to
§ 303(5). The correct reference is § 303(4). Compare RUPA § 703(b)(3). This error will be cor-
rected in the "glitch bill."
201. RUPA § 703(b).
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obligations to parties with whom he has dealt as a partner by sending
them an immediate notification of his dissociation.
c. Statement of Dissociation
The Revised Florida Act provides a more efficient and reliable
means of cutting off a dissociated partner's lingering apparent
authority and personal liability for new partnership obligations, how-
ever. Either the dissociated partner or the partnership may file a state-
ment of dissociation, 20 2 which operates as a limitation on the partner's
record authority under the usual rules applicable to record author-
ity.203 A properly recorded statement of dissociation in the real prop-
erty records conclusively terminates the dissociated partner's authority
to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership. 204 Filing
a statement with the Department of State does not limit the dissoci-
ated partner's apparent authority in any other type of transaction un-
less the other party to the transaction actually knows of the partner's
dissociation.
203
Contrary to the usual rule governing the effect of a filed limitation
of authority, FRUPA provides that, for the purposes of the rules gov-
erning a dissociated partner's lingering apparent authority2O6 and per-
sonal liability for new partnership obligations, 207 third parties are
deemed conclusively to have notice of the partner's dissociation ninety
days after the statement of dissociation is filed.201 Thus, a dissociated
partner's lingering apparent authority and personal liability for new
partnership obligations can be absolutely terminated in ninety days by
filing a statement of dissociation. That gives both the partnership and
the dissociated partner a strong incentive to file a statement of dissoci-
ation. Moreover, as an exception to the general rule in Florida, a
statement of dissociation may be filed even if the partnership has not
previously registered with the Department of State.
209
202. FRUPA § 704(1). A statement of dissociation may be filed even if the partnership has
not registered with the Department of State. Id. § 704(2).
203. Id. § 704(3).
204. See id. § 303(4), discussed supra note 90 and accompanying text.
205. See id. § 303(5), discussed supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
206. See id. § 702(1), discussed supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
207. See id. § 703(2), discussed supra note 200 and accompanying text.
208. Id. § 704(4). The Revised Florida Act § 704(3) provides that a statement of dissociation
is also a limitation on the authority of a dissociated partner for the purposes of § 303(5) and (6).
Those cross references to § 303(5) and (6) are in error. The correct references are to § 303(3) and
(4). Compare RUPA § 704(b). The error will be cured by the "glitch bill."
209. FRUPA § 704(2). Under FRUPA § 105(4), registration with the Department of State is
generally a condition precedent to filing statements under FRUPA. See supra note 43 and ac-
companying text (discussing registration).
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While FRUPA's constructive notice regime for statements of disso-
ciation provides benefits to partners and partnerships, it imposes a
cost on third parties doing business with partnerships. That is because
third parties must check the records of the Department of State at
least every ninety days if they wish to rely on the apparent authority
of a person known to have been a partner or if they are extending
credit to the partnership on the strength of that person's personal
credit.
6. Winding Up the Partnership's Business
The Revised Florida Act greatly clarifies the rules governing the
rights and duties of the partners in winding up the partnership's busi-
ness after an event of dissolution.
After dissolution, any partner may participate in winding up the
partnership's business. 210 Winding up includes the sale of all partner-
ship assets, either as a going concern or otherwise, payment or dis-
charge of all partnership liabilities, and distribution of the surplus, if
any, to the partners in accordance with their rights to distributions.2 1
Each partner is entitled to a settlement of all partnership accounts
upon winding up the business.212 In settling the accounts, the profits
and losses that result from the liquidation of the partnership assets
must be credited and charged to the partners' accounts. 2 3 A partner
with a positive account balance will receive a final liquidating distribu-
tion in that amount, while a partner with a negative account balance
must contribute the difference to the partnership.
21 4
7. Partners' Agency Authority After Dissolution
After an event of dissolution, the partnership continues only for the
purpose of winding up its business 2 5 and the scope of the partners'
210. FRUPA § 803(1). A wrongfully dissociated partner may not participate in the winding
up, however. Id. Any partner may, for good cause, request that a court supervise the winding
up. Id.
211. See id. §§ 803(1), (3), 807(1). Final distributions to the partners must be in cash, unless
otherwise agreed. Id. § 807(1).
212. Id. § 807(2).
213. Id. One of FRUPA's significant contributions is the creation of a default system of
partnership accounting. The Revised Florida Act § 401(l) provides that each partner is deemed
to have an account that is credited with the amount of the partner's capital contributions and
share of the profits. All distributions to the partner and the partner's share of the losses are
charged to the account. That establishes a rudimentary system of partner capital accounts, the
generally accepted method of partnership accounting. The Revised Florida Act § 807(2) provides
for closing out those accounts upon winding up.
214. FRUPA § 807(2). That is only a default rule. The partners may agree that a negative
account balance does not reflect a debt to the partnership and need not be repaid in settling the
partners' accounts. See RUPA § 807, cmt. 3.
215. FRUPA § 802(l).
19951
240 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:201
actual authority contracts accordingly.21 6 A partner's usual apparent
authority continues, however, if the other party to the transaction
does not have notice of the dissolution." 7 A partner who, knowing of
the event of dissolution, nevertheless incurs a partnership liability that
is inappropriate for winding up the business is liable to the partner-
ship for any damage caused."'
The partnership's exposure to liability for a partner's inappropriate
obligation may be limited, however, by filing a statement of dissolu-
tion.219 A filed statement of dissolution cancels a filed statement of
authority, 20 and after ninety days third parties are conclusively
deemed to have notice of the dissolution and, accordingly, of the limi-
tation on the authority of all of the partners. 21
H. "Safe Harbor"for Partnership Conversions and Mergers
Adoption of the entity theory also facilitates partnership conver-
sions and mergers which, although now quite common, are funda-
mentally inconsistent with the aggregate theory. Not surprisingly,
then, the UPA is silent on the subject. Article 9 of the Revised Florida
Act provides much needed certainty as to the validity of such transac-
tions and their legal effect on the rights and liabilities of the partners
and the title to partnership property.
216. Thus, after dissolution, the partnership is bound by a partner's act that is appropriate
for winding up the business, and each partner is liable to the other partners for her share of any
partnership liability incurred in winding up. See id. §§ 804(l), 806(1).
217. Id. § 804(2). That is a slight change from a partner's usual apparent authority under
FRUPA § 301(1), which provides that the partnership is bound by a partner's act in the ordinary
course of business unless the other party knew or had received a notification of the partner's
lack of authority. Under § 804(2), the partnership is not bound by an act inappropriate for
winding up if the other party should have known of the dissolution.
218. Id. § 806(2).
219. See id. § 805(1). Any partner who has not wrongfully dissociated may file a statement
of dissolution. Id. In Florida, a statement of dissolution may not be filed unless the partnership
is registered with the Department of State. See id. § 105(4), discussed supra note 43 and accom-
panying text.
220. FRUPA § 805(2). The statement must be properly recorded to be a limitation on a part-
ner's authority to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership. Id. § 303(4), dis-
cussed supra note 90 and accompanying text. The error in FRUPA § 704(3) is repeated in
FRUPA § 805(2). See supra note 208. The cross references to §§ 305(5) and 303(6) are incorrect.
They should refer to § 303(3) and (4). Compare RUPA § 805(b). This error will be cured in the
"glitch bill."
221. FRUPA § 805(3). Thereafter, a dissolved partnership may file and record a new state-
ment of partnership authority granting authority to one or more of the partners to transfer
partnership property during the winding up period (or limiting the authority of a partner to do
so). The new statement of partnership authority is binding on the partnership and third parties
as provided in FRUPA § 303(3) and (4), whether or not the transaction is appropriate for wind-
ing up the partnership business. FRUPA § 805(4). Again, the cross-references to FRUPA
§ 303(5) and (6) are in error and will be corrected in the "glitch bill". Compare RUPA § 805(d).
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Article 9 is only a "safe harbor." Its requirements are neither man-
datory nor exclusive, 222 and partnerships may be converted or merged
in any other manner provided by law.?23 If the transaction conforms
to the requirements of Article 9, the conversion or merger is valid and
will enjoy the legal effect provided in the Act. It is likely that Article
9 will be followed in most cases because it adds comfort to lawyers
rendering opinion letters as to the validity and effect of such transac-
tions.
1. Conversions
The key procedural safeguard in the conversion of a partnership or
limited partnership is the requirement that it be unanimously ap-
proved by all of the partners, s including limited partners.2 2 Florida
adds the requirement that all partners be promptly notified of a con-
version to a limited partnership and provided a copy of the statutory
section governing the conversion and the partners' liability for the
converted partnership's obligations.? 7 In light of the Act's concern
over exposing a former limited partner to personal liability as a gen-
eral partner of the converted partnership where the partner lacks
knowing consent, it is strange that Florida does not impose a similar
222. FRUPA § 908.
223. Id. Some state limited partnership acts authorize the conversion of a limited partnership
to a general partnership or the merger of limited and general partnerships, while other states
have adopted so-called cross-entity merger and conversion statutes. Those procedures may be
followed. See RUPA § 908, cmt.
224. See FRUPA §§ 904(l) (effect of conversion), 906(1) (effect of merger).
225. See id. §§ 902(2) (general to limited partnership), 903(2) (limited to general partner-
ship). Section 902(2) provides a narrow exception for approval of the conversion of a general to
a limited partnership by a lesser number or a percentage specified for conversion in the partner-
ship agreement. Section 903(2) expressly provides that the approval of the conversion of a lim-
ited to a general partnership must be unanimous, notwithstanding a provision to the contrary in
the limited partnership agreement. That safeguard protects a limited partner from exposure to
personal liability as a general partner unless the partner clearly and knowingly consents. See
RUPA § 903, cmt.
226. The Revised Florida Act § 901 provides several definitions that are unique to Article 9.
For example, the term "partner," standing alone, includes both general and limited partners. Id.
§ 901(4). The term "partnership," as used in Article 9, retains its usual FRUPA definition
meaning a partnership formed under FRUPA § 202, that is, a general partnership. FRUPA
§ 101(4).
227. Id. § 902(6). It is difficult to see how the conversion could be approved by a partner
who did not have notice of it. FRUPA § 103(2)(g), itself a nonuniform addition to RUPA's list
of immutable rules, further provides that the Florida notice requirement may not be changed in
the partnership agreement. That addition to the list of immutable rules is misguided. Article 9
itself accomplishes the purpose by according "safe harbor" validity and certainty only to con-
versions and mergers where the dictates of Article 9 have been followed. Thus, failure to give the
required notice would leave the conversion or merger outside the peaceful waters of Article 9's
safe harbor.
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notice requirement on the conversion of a limited partnership to a
general partnership.
The Revised Florida Act carefully spells out the extent to which a
partner is liable for the partnership's obligations after conversion. A
former general partner who becomes a limited partner remains per-
sonally liable for all obligations incurred before the conversion while
he was a general partner. 228 That protects the rights of old partnership
creditors who could look to the partners personally at the time credit
was extended.
The newly minted limited partner may also be held personally liable
for any new obligation incurred by the converted partnership within
ninety days of the conversion, if the other party to the transaction
reasonably believes that the limited partner is still a general partner. 29
That is a variation of the lingering liability rule applicable to a dissoci-
ated partner and, in effect, treats third parties dealing with the con-
verted partnership as having constructive notice of a limited partner's
new status ninety days after the conversion. 230 Thereafter, a limited
partner's liability for the obligations of the converted partnership is
the same as any other limited partner under the Florida Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act.
21
A limited partner who becomes a general partner as the result of a
conversion is liable as a general partner only for those obligations of
the converted partnership that are incurred after the conversion; he
remains only limitedly liable for old obligations incurred before the
conversion.231
2. Effect of Conversion
Most fundamentally, the Revised Florida Act makes clear that a
partnership or limited partnership that has been converted pursuant to
Article 9 "is for all purposes the same entity that existed before the
conversion."'233
228. FRUPA § 902(5).
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. Although FRUPA does not authorize
the filing of a statement of conversion, the conversion of a general to a limited partnership does
not take effect until a certificate of limited partnership is filed. FRUPA § 902(4). Under
§ 620.108(1)(c), Florida Statutes, the certificate must include the name of each general partner.
231. FRUPA § 902(5). The liability of a limited partner is governed by § 620.129, Florida
Statutes.
232. FRUPA § 903(5). Obviously, a partner who remains a general partner of the converted
limited partnership is personally liable for all partnership obligations regardless of when they
were incurred.
233. Id. § 904(1).
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One of the primary advantages of a continuing entity theory is that
no "transfer" of the converting partnership's assets and property is
required, thereby avoiding unnecessary deeds or other costly docu-
mentation of the converted entity's title to the property. Accordingly,
RUPA provides simply that "all property owned by the converting
partnership or limited partnership remains vested in the converted en-
tity.1 234 Personal property of a converting partnership is so treated
under FRUPA,235 but the rule with respect to real property is differ-
ent. Defying the logic of the entity theory and eschewing RUPA's sim-
plicity, the Revised Florida Act provides: "Title to all real property
owned by the converting partnership or limited partnership shall be
transferred by deed to the converted entity.'1236
Revenue was the reason for that anomalous rule. The Florida Reve-
nue Estimating Conference reasoned that allowing title to a converting
partnership's real property to pass by operation of law would cost the
state money. 237 That is because, under present law based on the aggre-
gate theory, a converting partnership must transfer title to its real
property by deed to the converted entity, which is a new entity. Under
general law, that requires the converted entity to pay a documentary
stamp tax in order to record the deed. 23 1 To assure that FRUPA was
at least "revenue neutral," the House Committee on Finance and
Taxation amended the bill to continue the requirement of a deed to
transfer a converting partnership's real property to itsef.23 9 And thus
is sausage made.
Such perverse treatment did not befall the rights of existing credi-
tors of the converting partnership. Respecting the logic that the con-
verted partnership is the same entity, the rights of existing creditors
are not affected by the conversion. Specifically, FRUPA provides
that, after the conversion, all obligations of the converting partner-
ship continue as obligations of the converted entity and an action or
proceeding pending against it may be continued as if the conversion
234. RUPA § 904(b)(1).
235. FRUPA § 904(2)(a) ("Title to all personal property owned by the converting partner-
ship or limited partnership remains vested in the converted entity.") (emphasis added).
236. Id. § 904(2)(a) (emphasis added). The amendment was proposed by Senator Harris and
adopted by the Senate on May 2, 1995. FLA. S. JouR. 669 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
237. Memorandum from Pam Johnson, Division of Economic and Demographic Research
to Consensus Estimating Conference Principals and Participants (Apr. 7, 1995) (on file with
author).
238. See FLA. STAT. § 201.02, .022 (1995).
239. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. & Tax'n, CS for HB 2187 (1995) Staff Analysis 2 (Apr. 30,
1995) (on file with committee).
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had not occurred. 0 Florida adds, by way of emphasis: "Neither the
rights of creditors of a converting partnership or limited partnership
nor any liens upon the property of a converting partnership or limited
partnership are impaired by a conversion."24
3. Mergers
The Revised Florida Act expressly authorizes the merger of a gen-
eral partnership with one or more general or limited partnerships. 22
The FRUPA "safe harbor" procedures are similar to those governing
corporate mergers. The terms of the merger, and the manner and ba-
sis of converting the interests of the partners of each party to the
merger into interests or obligations of the surviving entity, must be set
forth in a plan of merger.23 The plan must be approved by all the
partners, unless the partnership agreement specifically provides other-
wise for mergers.-" The surviving entity may be either a general part-
nership or a limited partnership .45
240. FRUPA § 904(2)(b), (3). Florida has modified the text of FRUPA to parallel the corpo-
rate merger provisions of § 607.1106, Florida Statutes, so that FRUPA § 904(2)(b) reads "All
liabilities and obligations . .." and FRUPA § 904(3) reads "A claim existing or action or pro-
ceeding pending by or against a converting partnership ...." (additions to text underlined). No
substantive change is intended. See FRUPA § 904, Fla. cmt. FLORMA BAR CLE ON PARTSmSHIP
LAW, supra note 65, at 144.
241. Id. § 904(4). That admonition would not appear to add anything substantive to the
rights of creditors or lienors.
242. Id. § 905(1).
243. Id. § 905(2). A partner may also be "cashed out" under the terms of the plan of
merger. Id. § 905(2)(e). The Florida Revised Act then adds specifically: "Each partner of a party
to the merger is entitled only to the rights provided in the plan of merger." Id. § 906(1)(O.
Presumably, "rights" means "economic rights."
That nonuniform amendment is troubling, however. The Revised Florida Act § 906(5) pro-
vides, as does RUPA, that a partner of a party to a merger who does not become a partner of
the surviving entity is dissociated from the entity of which she was a partner, and "the surviving
entity shall cause such partner's interest in the entity to be purchased" under § 701. Unless oth-
erwise provided in the partnership agreement, that entitles a dissociating partner to the buyout
value of her partnership interest, which may be more than provided in the plan of merger. In
effect, a dissociating partner's FRUPA § 701 right to a buyout is similar to a dissenting share-
holder's appraisal right in a corporate merger. See FLA. SrAT. § 607.1302 (1995). The issue is
unlikely to arise in the partnership merger context, however, because under FRUPA § 905(3),
with limited exceptions, every partner must consent to the plan of merger. In any event, a part-
ner of the surviving entity may always dissociate after the merger, thereby triggering a buyout of
her interest in the surviving entity under FRUPA § 701, unless the partnership agreement pro-
vides otherwise. See FRUPA §§ 103(a), 601, 602(1), 603(1), and 701, discussed supra notes 26-
32, 147-54, 179-81 and accompanying text.
A partner who is dissociated in a merger has apparent authority to bind the partnership under
FRUPA § 702 and is personally liable for post-merger obligations under FRUPA § 703 to the
same extent as any other dissociated partner. See FRUPA § 906(5).
244. Id. § 905(3)(a). Notwithstanding a provision to the contrary in the partnership agree-
ment, a merger must be approved by all of the partners of a limited partnership, including
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If the "safe harbor" provisions of FRUPA are followed, the part-
ners' post-merger personal liability is carefully spelled out in the Act.
A general partner of the surviving entity is personally liable for all
pre-merger obligations for which the partner was personally liable be-
fore the merger and all post-merger obligations incurred by the surviv-
ing entity after the merger; such a general partner is not personally
liable for any pre-merger obligations of a party to the merger for
which the partner was not personally liable before the merger.2 6 A
limited partner of the surviving entity is personally liable only for a
pre-merger obligation for which he was personally liable as a general
partner of a party to the merger.147 The surviving entity is liable for all
pre-merger obligations of every party to the merger, obligations which
may be satisfied out of any of the surviving entity's property.3
4. Effect of Merger
The legal effects of a partnership merger under the Revised Florida
Act mirror the effects of a corporate merger. On the effective date of
the merger,4 9 the separate existence of every party to the merger,
other than the surviving entity, ceases, 210 and all obligations of every
party to the merger become the obligations of the surviving entity.25'
Any action pending against a party to the merger may be continued as
if the merger had not occurred, or the surviving entity may be substi-
tuted as a party to the action. 212
FRUPA's provisions regarding title to property owned by the par-
ties to the merger are like those applicable to a partnership conver-
sion. All personal property owned by each of the merged partnerships
limited partners, except as otherwise specifically provided by the law of the jurisdiction in which
the limited partnership is organized. Id. § 905(3)(b). That is to protect limited partners from
exposure to liability as general partners without their clear and knowing consent.
Florida requires that each partner be given prompt notice of the merger, together with a copy
of the FRUPA merger provisions. FRUPA § 905(6); cf. id. § 902(6) (notice of conversion). The
notice requirement may not be changed in the partnership agreement. Id. § 103(2)(g). The notice
requirement is redundant, and its obligatory character is misguided. See supra note 227.
245. FRUPA § 905(2)(c).
246. Id. § 906(3).
247. Id. § 906(3)(a).
248. See id. § 906(l)(c). If the surviving entity becomes insolvent before satisfying a pre-
merger obligation of a party to the merger, the general partners of that party must contribute the
amount necessary to satisfy that party's obligations. Id. § 906(4).
249. See id. § 905(5).
250. Id. § 906(l)(a).
251. Id. § 906(l)(c). The Revised Florida Act § 906(l)(b)-(e) contain nonuniform changes
similar to those in FRUPA § 904(2)-(4), § 906(l)(b)-(e) is discussed supra notes 235-41 and ac-
compaying text.
252. FRUPA § 906(l)(d).
1995]
246 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:201
vests in the surviving entity by operation of law. 253 But, as in the case
of a conversion, and for the same reason, Florida does not follow the
uniform rule with respect to real property owned by the merged part-
nerships. 25 4 Instead, FRUPA requires that title to such real property
be transferred by deed to the surviving entity, 25 notwithstanding a
contrary Florida rule governing the transfer of title to real property in
a corporate merger. 256
After a merger, the surviving partnership may file a statement of
merger,25 7 which must contain the name of each party to the merger
and the name of the surviving entity. 25 Under RUPA, after a state-
ment of merger is filed and, for real property, properly recorded, all
property which before the merger was held in the name of another
party to the merger becomes property held in the name of the surviv-
ing entity for the purposes of the partnership transfer rules.25 9 Thus,
after filing and recording a statement of merger, every general partner
of the surviving entity has authority to transfer property, real or per-
sonal, held in the surviving entity's name, subject to the effect of a
statement of partnership authority thereafter filed by the surviving en-
tity.2 6 Florida modifies the uniform rule by deleting any reference to
real property of the surviving entity previously held in the name of
another party to the merger. 261 The change presumably reflects the
253. Id. § 906(1)(b); cf id. § 904(2)(a) (effect of conversion).
254. Compare RUPA § 906(a)(2); see supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing
the reason for the Florida alteration).
255. See FRUPA § 906(l)(b). With respect to personal property, however, FRUPA follows
the uniform rule that title to personal property owned by each of the merged partnerships vests
in the surviving entity, adding "without reversion or impairment." Id. That qualification is
taken from the Florida corporate merger provision. FLA. STAT. § 607.1106(1)(b) (1995). Since,
under general law, property conveyed to a corporation no longer reverts to the grantor upon the
corporation's dissolution, this qualification has no operative effect and thus is unnecessary. See
THoMPsoN ON REAL PROPERTY § 22.02, at 263 (Thomas ed. 1994).
256. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1106(1)(b) (1995) (title to real property owned by each party to
merger vests in surviving entity by operation of law).
257. FRUPA § 907. Florida adds, as a condition of filing a statement of merger, that any
limited partnership that is a party to the merger must be registered with the Department of State.
Id. § 907(3).
258. Id. § 907(2).
259. See RUPA § 907(c) (all property except real property), (d) (real property). The Revised
Florida Act § 907(4), the Florida counterpart to RUPA § 907(c), applies only to "personal prop-
erty." To the extent that "personal property" includes intangible property, there is no substan-
tive difference.
260. See FRUPA § 302(l)(a).
261. That is, FRUPA has no counterpart to RUPA § 907(d). Thus, the FRUPA § 302 rules
for the transfer of property held in the name of the partnership do not apply to real property of
the surviving entity which before the merger was held in the name of another party to the merger
unless the chain of title to the property is evidenced by a deed to the surviving entity.
Therefore, the cross reference to subsection (4) in the last line of FRUPA § 907(5), the
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Florida requirement that title to real property owned by the parties to
the merger must be transferred to the surviving entity by deed, rather
than by operation of law.
26 2
L Effective Date of FRUPA and Transition Rules
The Revised Florida Act has an effective date of January 1, 1996.6 It
is not, however, applicable to all partnerships as of that date. Because of
the extensive changes to existing law, especially the rules governing the
relations of the partners inter se, FRUPA provides for a delayed date
with respect to its mandatory applicability to existing partnerships.2
Until January 1, 1998, FRUPA will govern only those partnerships
formed after January 1, 1996, the Act's effective date, 2 5 unless the part-
nership elects to be governed by the Revised Act.2  Partnerships formed
under present law before January 1, 1996, will continue to be governed
by the Florida UPA until January 1, 1998. At any time after January 1,
1996, an existing partnership may, in the manner provided in its partner-
ship agreement or under the UPA procedure for amending the partner-
ship agreement,267 voluntarily elect to be governed by FRUPA.m After
January 1, 1998, FRUPA governs all Florida partnerships. s6
counterpart to RUPA § 907(e), is correct in limiting the operation of that subsection to personal
property. The reference to FRUPA § 105(3) is erroneous, however. The correct reference will be
to FRUPA § 105(6). Compare RUPA §§ 105(c), 907(e). It will be corrected in the "glitch bill."
The Revised Florida Act § 907(6) is both redundant and incorrect, being identical to FRUPA
§ 907(5), except for the additional and inappropriate cross reference to subsection (5) in the last
line. The Revised Uniform Act § 907(e), from which FRUPA § 907(6) is derived, refers to sub-
sections (d) and (e), but FRUPA has no counterpart to RUPA § 907(d), since Florida requires a
deed to transfer real property to the surviving entity in a merger. The Revised Florida Act
§ 907(6) will be repealed in the "glitch bill."
262. See FRUPA § 906(l)(b), discussed supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
263. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 13, 2150, 2160. The Act does not affect any action or pro-
ceeding commenced or any right accrued before January 1, 1996. Id. § 15 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 620.91 (1995)). For an explanation of the meaning of that provision, see RUPA § 1007, cmt.
264. Aceord RUPA § 1006.
265. FLA. STAT. § 620.90(l)(a) (1995). There is an exception for partnerships that are formed
after January 1, 1996, to continue the business of a dissolved partnership under FLA. STAT.
§ 620.76 (1995) (UPA § 41).
266. FLA. STAT. § 620.90(l)(b) (1995).
267. Id. § 620.645(8) (UPA § 18(h)). That section requires the unanimous consent of all the
partners to amend the partnership agreement, unless otherwise agreed.
268. Id. § 620.90(3). If before January 1, 1998, an existing partnership elects to be governed
by FRUPA, the provisions of the new Act that limit a partner's liability (such as FRUPA
§ 704(4), which cuts off a dissociated partner's lingering liability 90 days after the filing of a
statement of dissociation) are inapplicable to a third party who had done business with the
partnership within the preceding year unless that party knows (or has received a notification) of
the partnership's election. Id.
269. Id. § 620.90(2). The provisions of the Florida UPA, FLA. STAT. §§ 620.56-.77 (1995),
axe repealed effective January 1, 1998. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 25.
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III. FLORIDA REGISTERED LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
The rush to authorize so-called registered limited liability partner-
5hips (LLPs) began with Texas in 1991.270 Over thirty-five states have
now adopted Some form of LLP statute.271 The impetus for protection
from vicarious liability for torts committed by another partner grew
out of the many lawsuits against national accounting firms and major
law firms as a result of the savings and loan debacle of the late
1980s. 27 2 Lobbied for heavily on behalf of such professional partner-
ships, LLP laws seek primarily to limit the personal liability of a part-
ner for malpractice committed by another partner. 273 The NCCUSL
drafting committee considered proposing such legislation as a part of
the Revised Uniform Act, but rejected the idea because, at the time,
LLPs were still novel and there was not a national consensus as to
their legitimacy. 274 In August, 1995, the Partnership Committee of the
ABA Business Law Section approved a "Prototype" Registered Lim-
ited Liability Partnership Act (ABA Prototype Act) which integrates
limited liability provisions directly into the Revised Uniform Act. 27 In
response to the overwhelming embrace of LLP legislation by the
270. See 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 901, §§ 83-85 (codified at Tax. Rxv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 15, 45-A to -C (West 1995)); Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Part-
nerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. CoLO. L. Rnv. 1065 (1995). For further back-
ground and an analysis of the Texas Act, see R. Dennis Anderson et al., Registered LLPs, 55
TFXAS B.J. 728 (1992). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has lobbied ex-
tensively for the adoption of LLPs. It is no surprise that all of the so-called "Big Six" account-
ing firms are now Delaware-registered LLPs. See Hamilton, supra, at 1066.
271. See Kendall L. Houghton, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships: Multistate
Issues Case Study, LLC AnvisoR (CCH), Oct. 1995, at 2, 4.
272. See, e.g., Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, Seeking Shelter: Partnership Structure Is
Called in Question as Liability Risk Rises, WAn. ST. J., June 10, 1992, at AI; Hamilton, supra
note 270, at 1065; BaohamEo & RmslasN oN LLPs, supra note 6, § 1.01(a), at 2.
273. See 6 DaL. CoDE § 1515(b) (1995); IOWA CoDE § 486.15(2) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 59-45 (1995). See generally ABA GUIDE TO LLPs, supra note 6, § 2; BaomBERo & RmsraNt oN
LLPs, supra note 6, § 1.02(b), at 15.
A growing number of states, however, shield partners of LLPs from personal liability for all
partnership debts and obligations, not just vicarious tort liability. See infra note 289 and accom-
panying text.
274. See NCCUSL Poucy CHoices 8 (1994).
275. The ABA Prototype Act was approved by the Partnership Committee at its meeting on
August 9, 1995, and has been recommended to the ABA Business Law Section and to NCCUSL.
Elizabeth (Bitsy) Hester, of Richmond, Virginia, and Edward (Doc) Merrill, of Walnut Creek,
California, co-chaired the working group that authored the ABA Prototype Act. Doc Merrill
was also one of the ABA advisors to the RUPA drafting committee. Louis T.M. Conti, of Or-
lando, was a member of the ABA Prototype Act working group and is an ABA advisor to the
NCCUSL drafting committee. Betsy Hester, Working Group RLLPs Completes Prototype Reg-
istered Limited Liability Partnership Statutes, PUBOGRAM 3 (ABA Section of Business Law,
Chicago, Ill., July 1995).
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various states in late 1995, NCCUSL appointed a new committee to
draft optional limited liability provisions for adoption with RUPA.
27 6
Although finally enacted as a part of the same bill as the Florida Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act,211 the Florida LLP provisions are sepa-
rate and independent of FRUPA. 27 Indicative of the haste with which
the states have embraced LLP legislation, the Florida LLP provisions
went into effect on July 1, 1995, 279 without any waiting period. Moreo-
ver, an existing Florida partnership may become an LLP without any
notification to its present creditors or clients or other affected parties.2
A. Registration
To become a registered LLP in Florida, a partnership must file a
registration statement with the Department of State.28' The partner-
ship must pay an annual registration fee of $100 for each partner
whose principal residence is in Florida, with the total not to exceed
$10,000.212 The partnership's name must contain the words
"Registered Limited Liability Partnership" or the designation "LLP"
at the end.383 A limited partnership may also become a registered lim-
ited liability partnership, using the designation "Ltd. LLP."214
276. Telephone Interview with John M. McCabe, NCCUSL Legislative Director/Legal
Counsel (Nov. 15, 1995). The committee is chaired by Dean Harry J. Haynsworth, IV, of Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law. The reporter is Professor Carter G. Bishop of Suffolk University
Law School.
277. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 13, 2150, 2160.
278. Id. §8 1-12, 2150, 2152. The failure to integrate the LLP provisions into FRUPA creates
several ambiguities, and it has been suggested that the "glitch bill" amend FRUPA to provide a
number of coordinating provisions, along the lines of the ABA Prototype Act.
279. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-242, § 33, 2150, 2192. The provisions of FRUPA became effec-
tive on January 1, 1996. Id. § 13, 2150, 2160. Thus, an existing Florida partnership created
under the UPA could have registered as an LLP, even before FRUPA became effective.
280. Section 620.786(2), Florida Statutes, provides that a filed statement of registration as an
LLP is "notice" that the partnership is an LLP. The significance of such notice is unclear.
Omission of the LLP designation (or the equivalent) in the use of the name of the partnership
renders any person who participates in the omission, or knowingly acquiesces in it, liable for any
indebtedness, damage, or liability "occasioned by the omission," unless the claimant had "ac-
tual notice" ("knowledge" per FRUPA), or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
had actual notice ("notice" per FRUPA), that the partnership was an LLP. FLA. STAT.
§ 620.784(3) (1995). That would seem to require use of the LLP designation in the partnership's
letterhead and on all billing statements, although the exact meaning is not clear.
281. FLA. STAT. § 620.78(l) (1995). The registration statement includes the usual basic infor-
mation about the partnership, such as its name, principal office, registered Florida office, num-
ber of partners, and a brief statement describing its business. Id. There is no requirement that
the partnership be formed under Florida law, and thus a foreign partnership could file as a
registered LLP under the Florida statute. This may be changed in the "glitch bill."
282. Id. § 620.78(3), (6). Non-resident partners were exempted from the registration fee at
the urging of large, national accounting and law firms with fewer than 100 Florida partners.
283. Id. § 620.784().
284. Id. § 620.788(1), (2)(c). Only a domestic limited partnership may become an LLP in
Florida. Id. Limited liability limited partnerships are being referred to as LLLPs.
1995l
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B. Mandatory Insurance
Under the Florida statute, an LLP must carry liability insurance
covering the errors, omissions, negligence, malpractice, and wrongful
acts for which a partner's liability is limited. 21s The statutory "mini-
mum coverage amount" of such insurance is $100,000 multiplied by
the number of partners, up to a maximum of $3 million. 2 6 Many
states' LLP statutes do not have an insurance requirement."",
C. Limitation of Partners' Personal Liability
Most of the early LLP statutes limited a partner's individual liabil-
ity only in the case of torts committed by another person, such as the
malpractice of another partner. 2ss The recent trend, however, is to ex-
pand the limitation to cover other liabilities, and at least fifteen states
now shield partners fully from individual liability for any and all part-
nership obligations, other than their own malpractice and other tor-
tious conduct. 9
285. Id. § 620.7851(1)(a). An LLP may, in lieu of such insurance, provide an irrevocable
letter of credit in the minimum coverage amount, issued by an authorized bank or savings asso-
ciation. Id. § 620.7851(1)(b).
286. Id. § 620.7851(2).
287. See, e.g., GA. CODE §§ 14-8-44 to 64 (1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 323.44-.47 (1994); N.Y.
PA sTmENsnn" LAW §§ 121-1500 to 1503 (McKinney 1995). The ABA Prototype Act does not
have an insurance requirement.
288. See ABA GuIDE To LLPs, supra note 6, § 2.
289. See BROtaERo & Rmsmn ON LLPs, supra note 6, § 1.01. New York and Minnesota
were the first states to adopt so-called full-shield statutes. See id. § 1.01(d). Many of the "second
generation" LLP acts adopted in 1995 completely eliminate partners' vicarious liability. In addi-
tion to the eleven states cited by Bromberg and Ribstein, id. § 1.10(e), four additional states
have now adopted full-shield statutes. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15015 (West 1995); 1995 Mass.
Laws ch. 281 (H.B. 4045); 1995 Or. Laws ch. 689.; PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 8201-21 (1995).
Section 306(c) of the ABA Prototype Act provides a full corporate-type shield:
A person is not, solely by reason of being a partner, liable, directly or indirectly,
including by way of indemnification, contribution, assessment or otherwise, for debts,
obligations or liabilities of, or chargeable to, the partnership, whether sounding in
tort, contract or otherwise, which are incurred, created or assumed by the partnership
while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership.
Unlike Section 620.782(2)(b), Florida Statutes, and most state LLP statutes, the ABA Prototype
Act is silent with respect to a partner's liability for the partner's own malpractice and other
misconduct, including the partner's failure to supervise others. Those matters are thus left to
general law, in the same manner as the personal liability of an active corporate shareholder.
The uniform LLP amendments to RUPA, soon to be considered by the NCCUSL drafting
committee, include full-shield protection. Section 306(c) of the initial proposed draft provides:
Notwithstanding contrary provisions in a partnership agreement existing on the effec-
tive date of a registration statement, obligations incurred while a partnership is a reg-
istered limited liability partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are
solely the obligations of the registered limited liability partnership. A partner is not
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The Florida statute29° is of the more benign type. It provides:
(1) A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not
individually liable for obligations, or liabilities of the partnership,
whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, arising from errors,
omissions, negligence, malpractice, or wrongful acts291 committed by
another partner or by an employee, agent, or representative of the
partnership while the partnership is a registered limited liability
partnership.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, a partner in a
registered limited liability partnership is individually liable for:
personally liable for such an obligation of the registered limited liability partnership
solely by reason of being or acting as a partner.
UNiFORm PARTNEsHt AcT (Discussion Draft Dec. 6, 1995). New Article 11 provides for the
registration of a domestic partnership (or limited partnership) as an LLP (or LLLP), and Article
12 provides for the registration of a foreign LLP. The proposed uniform amendments do not
contain any insurance requirement.
Limiting the vicarious personal liability of partners runs counter to the economic analysis of
some commentators. These commentators suggest that limited liability is not efficient in the
context of a closely held enterprise and therefore the shareholders of a close corporation should
be held personally liable. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC
STRUCTtnE OF CORPORATE LAW 55-56 (1991). This argument is strongest in the case of tort
liability. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). Others argue that limited liability is efficient
and should be extended to any form of closely held enterprise. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser,
Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87
Nw. U. L. Rav. 148, 171-72 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability
and the Death of Partnership, 70 WAsH. U. L.Q. 417, 438-50 (1992). One commentator has
taken a middle ground. See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,
91 COLUM. L. Rav. 1565, 1636 (1991) (limited liability conditioned on adequate liability insur-
ance). Whether or not limited liability for closely held business enterprises is economically effi-
cient, the political judgment would seem to have been resolved by the approval of full-shield
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) in nearly every state. See William J. Carney, Limited Lia-
bility Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. Rv. 855, 857-59 (1995); Robert B.
Thompson, The Taming of Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 939-43
(1995). The adoption of the Massachusetts LLC Act, H.B. 4045, 1995 Law ch. 281, leaves only
Hawaii and Vermont without LLC legislation. See Massachusetts Passes LLC Legislation, LLC
ADVISOR 4, 3 (CCH Dec. 1995). There is little to distinguish LLPs from LLCs with respect to the
risk of harm to creditors from full-shield protection against personal liability. For a comparison
of members' personal liability in LLCs and LLPs, see BRoMaERG & RtasTEiN ON LLPs, supra
note 6, § 3.01.
290. FLA. STAT. § 620.782(1) (1995).
291. The term "wrongful acts" is ambiguous. It is not altogether clear, for example, whether
"wrongful acts" would include a partner's intentional torts or civil liability under various statu-
tory regimes, such as employment discrimination or sexual harassment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (1994). See BROMBERO & RiasTEn' ON LLPs,
supra note 6, § 3.04(b), ex. 4, at 87-88. If so, the partnership must have liability insurance or a
letter of credit covering such liability. See FLA. STAT. § 620.7851 (1995). Insurance coverage for
such misconduct is not available, however.
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(a) Any debts or obligations of the partnership arising from
any cause other than those specified in subsection (1);
(b) Any errors, omissions, negligence, malpractice, or
wrongful acts committed by the partner or any person under the
partner's direct supervision and control in the specific activity in
which the error, omission, negligence, malpractice, or wrongful act
occurred; or
(c) Any debts for which the partner has agreed in writing to be
liable.
The liability of the partnership entity is not affected by those limita-
tions on the partners' individual liability.
2 92
The Florida statute also provides that the liability of partners in an
LLP "formed and registered" under the Florida LLP provisions must
be determined solely by these Florida LLP provisions.2 93 If a conflict
arises between the laws of Florida and any other jurisdiction with re-
gard to the individual liability of a partner in an LLP "formed and
registered" in Florida, the statute provides that the laws of Florida
shall govern. 29 That rule is binding on Florida courts, 29 but it may
not be followed by courts in other states. 6
D. Regulation of LLP Rendering Professional Services
An LLP that provides professional services regulated by a state reg-
ulatory agency remains subject to the agency's supervision, including
disciplinary proceedings, in the same manner and to the same extent
as an individual who is licensed to practice such a profession.2 It is
uncertain whether a Florida law firm may become an LLP. To remove
any doubt, the Florida Supreme Court may be requested to approve
292. FLA. STAT. § 620.782(5) (1995).
293. Id. § 620.783(1).
294. Id. § 620.783(2); see also id. § 620.7885(4) (liability of partners of registered foreign
LLP governed by law of state of organization).
295. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNrD) OF CONMhICTS § 6(1) (1969) (court will follow a statutory
directive of its own state).
296. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Cos.uc'"s § 174 (1969) provides that a partner's vicari-
ous liability for the torts of another partner is determined by the law selected under § 145 princi-
ples. Section 145, in turn, provides that tort liability is determined by the local law of the state
with the "most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties," including the place of
the injury, the residence of the parties, and the place where the relationship between the parties
is centered. See Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May
Go: The Restatement's View of LLCs and LLPs in Interstate TransactiQns, LLC ADvisoR 4, 5
(CCH Apr. 1995); Louis F. Lobenhofer, Limited Liability Entities in Ohio: A Primer on the
Limited Liability Company and Partnership with Limited Liability, Their Substantive and Tax
Aspects, 21 Owo N.U. L. REv. 39, 94-95 (1994).
297. FLA. STAT. § 620.787(1) (1995). The LLP must provide the agency with a certified copy
of its registration statement. Id. § 620.787(2).
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the practice of law as an LLP and to modify The Florida Bar Rules
accordingly.
29
E. Foreign Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
Before transacting business in Florida "as such," a foreign regis-
tered limited liability partnership must register with the Department of
State as a foreign LLP.299 The registration fee is the same as for a
domestic LLP.3 ° As a condition of registering in Florida, a foreign
LLP must have liability insurance with the same minimum coverage
amount as a registered Florida LLP,30° even if no insurance is required
under the law of the jurisdiction in which it was formed302
Somewhat surprisingly, the Florida statute expressly provides that a
foreign LLP's "organizational and internal affairs, including the lia-
bility of partners," is governed by the laws of the jurisdiction under
which the foreign LLP is organized 03 That means the partners in a
New York LLP, registered and doing business in Florida, have no per-
sonal liability to Florida contract creditors, without regard to the par-
ties' other contacts with Florida. In light of the much broader liability
shield now available to LLPs in several other states, that choice of law
provision is likely to foster a market in foreign LLPs, much to the
detriment of Florida creditors. 3°4
298. Presently, The Florida Bar Rules neither authorize nor prohibit the practice of law as an
LLC or an LLP. By analogy to the practice of law by a professional corporation (P.C. or P.A.),
which is permitted in Florida, there should be no objection to the practice of law without vicari-
ous malpractice liability by all members of the firm. See FLA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.6.
That rule was originally adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in 1961. See In re The Florida
Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961). The court stated: "In addition to the individual liability and
responsibility of the stockholder, the corporate entity will be liable for the misprisions of its
members to the extent of the corporate assets." Id. at 555. But see First Bank & Trust Co. v.
Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983), where the Georgia Supreme Court held, pursuant to its
authority to regulate the practice of law, that every member of a Georgia law firm is personally
liable for the malpractice of the other members, even if the firm is organized as a professional
corporation under a state statute purporting to grant limited liability.
299. FLA. STAT. § 620.7885(1) (1995).
300. Id. § 620.7885(3). The fee is $100 per partner whose principal residence is in Florida,
not to exceed $10,000. Id.
301. Id. The minimum coverage amount is $100,000 per partner, up to $3 million. Id.
§ 620.7851(2).
302. A foreign LLP that was required to obtain liability insurance under its domestic law
may use that insurance to satisfy the Florida insurance requirement. See id. § 620.7885(2).
303. Id. § 620.7885(4). As originally filed, the bill provided that a partner's liability in an
LLP registered in Florida would be governed by the law of Florida. See CS for HB 717, § 10
(1995) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 620.84(4)).
304. It is not surprising that, according to the records of the Department of State, four of
the first six LLPs to register under the new Florida law were foreign. For an interesting discus-
sion of the potential market for foreign partnership charters, see Allan W. Vestal, Choice of
Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 79 IOWA
L. REv. 219, 247-50 (1994).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act is a much needed updating of
the law of partnership. It clarifies many of the old rules, enhancing
certainty and predictability. Adoption of the entity theory simplifies
the statutory implementation of many rules, including some that have
not been substantively changed. The most significant substantive
change, perhaps, is the complete restructuring of the partnership
breakup rules, which, under the UPA, had long been a source of irri-
tation and confusion. The revised rules governing the transfer of part-
nership property should lower transaction costs and enhance the
certainty of title, especially with respect to real property held in the
name of the partnership. The new conversion and merger rules will be
greatly appreciated by those involved in such transactions. The new
fiduciary duty rules, although criticized by some, are firmly rooted in
traditional principles, while permitting a reasonable degree of private
ordering. The recognition of limited liability partnerships is in keeping
with the contemporary national trend.
Florida should benefit from its vanguard adoption of the Revised
Uniform Act. It will be applauded by the state's business community
and the commercial law bar. By improving efficiency in the formation
and operation of partnerships, it will benefit the Florida economy. Be-
ing a uniform law, it will facilitate interstate activity by enhancing the
familiarity and confidence of those dealing with Florida partnerships.
Extensive nonuniform changes have been avoided, thereby optimizing
those benefits. Its early adoption will also contribute to Florida's
growing reputation for leadership in providing a hospitable legal envi-
ronment for business. In sum, Florida will enter the twenty-first cen-
tury with a thoroughly contemporary partnership law.
